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RUSSIAN DRAFT LAW ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONES-A STEP FORWARD, BUT NOT FAR ENOUGH
Valentin A. Povarchuk
Abstract: The situation in the Russian Far East epitomizes the acute need for
economic reform and development in Russia. The region boasts an enormous wealth of
metals, oil, gas, coal, timber, and marine resources, but has long suffered from excessive
dependence on the central government's administration and its accompanying historical
neglect. Taking a cue from China's successful use of special economic zones as a means
to encourage economic reform, some Russian policy-makers have proposed special
economic zones as a means to encourage development. Russia's early laws establishing
special economic zones, however, did not produce self-sustaining results due to a lack of
appropriate legal and physical infrastructures, as well as political and economic
instability. In addition, concerns over corruption and the imbalance of power between
local and central authorities contributed to their failures.
A Draft Law on Special Economic Zones proposed in 2003 by the Russian Ministry
of Economic Development and Trade demonstrates the newly increased sophistication in
Russian economic planning. Contrary to the criticism levied by its opponents, the Draft
Law is not likely to conflict with Russia's future World Trade Organization obligations.
As presently drafted, however, the Draft Law may not satisfy the development needs of
the Russian Far East. Specifically, the Draft Law provides for excessive centralization of
authority and fails to clearly allocate rulemaking responsibilities among various levels of
government. In addition, it contains overly strict criteria for establishing special
economic zones, and has the potential to disrupt some existing special economic zones.
Accordingly, Russian legislators should revise the Draft Law to remedy these
deficiencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kim Iskyan, the author of a recent article posted on the Internet
service Slate, proposed that Russia divest itself of its vast Far East region in
favor of the People's Republic of China ("China").' He suggested that
"[t]he [Russian Far East's] poor manufacturing base, crumbling physical
infrastructure, high transportation costs, and small natural markets
discourage local enterprise" and that the region thus lends itself to "a Far
East version of the Louisiana Purchase.",2 While the current level of Russian
nationalism obviates serious contemplation of this suggestion, 3 the
comparison of the Russian Far East ("RFE" or "Far East") to America's
1 See Kim Iskyan, Selling Off Siberia: Why China Should Purchase the Russian Far East, SLATE,
July 28, 2003, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2086157/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
2 Id. at*l.
3 See Rajan Menon & Charles E. Ziegler, Balance of Power and the U.S. Foreign Policy Interests in
the Russian Far East, in THE RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK 49 (Judith Thornton & Charles E.
Ziegler eds., 2002).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
"Wild West ' 4 unfortunately rings true.
By increasing economic development in the RFE, Russia could vastly
improve the lives of many of its own inhabitants, and establish a firmer
economic foothold in its territories, thereby reducing the temptation for
neighboring nations to do so.5 Proponents of the new Draft Law on Special
Economic Zones ("Draft Law") 6 cite the promotion of development in
economically de ?ressed regions, such as the RFE, among the Draft Law's
main objectives. However, the Draft Law is not Russia's first attempt to
promote development through the establishment of special economic zones
("SEZs"), and prior attempts produced only marginal results.8 Therefore, it
is appropriate to question whether the new Draft Law is in fact capable of
promoting development in the RFE.
This Comment analyzes the failures of the previous Russian SEZ
legislation and the likelihood of success of the new Draft Law by comparing
Russia's SEZ experiences to China's. Part II of this Comment traces the
economic problems of the RFE to longstanding mismanagement and neglect
by the central government and demonstrates that despite being one of the
poorest regions in Russia, the RFE has remarkable development potential.
In light of the comparison between the Chinese and Russian experiences
with SEZs, Part III asserts that SEZs can serve the development needs of
4 Iskyan, supra note 1, at *1.
5 The strategic security of the RFE and its territories is beyond the scope of this Comment.
However, the lands of the RFE have had varying owners in the past three centuries, and have been subject
to much contention and warfare between Russia and its neighbors. See generally JOHN J. STEPHAN, THE
RUSSIAN FAR EAST: A HISTORY (1994). While it appears unlikely that any of the Russian neighbors in the
Far East would once again resort to military force against the RFE, such a scenario is not entirely beyond
contemplation. See generally TOM CLANCY, THE BEAR AND THE DRAGON (2000) (contemplating a
demoralized and poorly equipped Russian military being quickly overrun by Chinese forces, ironically
well-equipped with the latest Russian military technology).
6 See Proekt: Rossiiskaia Federatsiia: Federal'nyi zakon ob Osobykh Ekonomicheskikh Zonakh v
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Draft Federal Law on Special Economic Zones in the Russian Federation] at
http://www.economy.gov.ru/merit/75 (last viewed Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Appendix A, Draft Law].
An English version of this draft law translated by the author appears in Appendix A.
Note that economic planners, legislators, and academics in Russia have used three different terms:
special economic zones ("SEZs"), free enterprise zones, and free economic zones ("FEZs"). The use of
these terms likely reflects an evolution in the thinking about the zones: Russia's earlier normative acts
contemplated the creation of FEZs, while the later draft laws referred to SEZs. Because the term "SEZ"
can be understood as a generic, representing a diverse range of economic regulatory phenomena, see infra
Part II.C, this Comment utilizes this term throughout for the sake of consistency.
7 See 0 printsipakh sozdaniia i funktsionirovaniia osobykh ekonomicheskikh zon [On principles of
creation and function of special economic zones], at *4, http://www.economy.gov.ru/merit/167.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs]. This document is provided at
the web site of the Russian Ministry for Economic Development and Trade along with the new Draft Law
as an explanatory note by the drafters describing their research findings, as well as the objectives of the
Draft Law.
8 See WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RussAN LAW 611-12 (1999).
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depressed regions under stable political, legal, and economic conditions.
Part IV analyzes Russia's new Draft Law, arguing that it is a more
sophisticated approach to SEZ formation than in the past and is not likely to
conflict with Russia's future obligations to the World Trade Organization.
Finally, Part V considers the more salient defects of the Draft Law and
suggests corresponding remedies.
II. RUSSIA SHOULD STRIVE TO CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR EAST
The RFE is currently among Russia's least-developed regions, despite
its wealth of natural resources.9 The region's current economic woes are an
outgrowth of historical neglect and mismanagement by Russian central
authorities and the economic turbulence of the 1990s.10 Given the region's
immense endowment of natural resources, " however, its potential for
development remains great. Within the RFE, the Kuril Islands-which
boast generous marine resources and close proximity to Japan2-are one
area where the right approach to development, including a well-planned SEZ,
could produce tangible economic improvements.
A. The Russian Far East's Economic Setbacks Stem from Historical
Mismanagement and Neglect
The RFE suffers from traditional neglect and mismanagement by the
central Russian authorities. 13  During the Soviet years, the region was
heavily dependent on external goods and subsidies from the central
government.' 4 The government offered inducements to individuals in the
9 Judith Thornton & Charles E. Ziegler, The Russian Far East in Perspective, in THE RUSSIA'S FAR
EAST: A REGION AT RISK 11 (Judith Thornton & Charles E. Ziegler eds., 2002). In fact, the standard of
living in the RFE is substantially more depressed than the already low all-Russian average. Id.
IS See id. at 4-6; SuE DAVIS, THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST: THE LAST FRONTIER? 15, 60-63 (2003).
11 See generally THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST: AN ECONOMIC SURVEY 30-42 (Pavel A. Minakir, ed.,
Gregory L. Freeze, ed. & trans., 1996) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SURVEY].
12 KIMIE HARA, JAPANESE-SOVIET/RUSSiAN RELATIONS SINCE 1945: A DIFFICULT PEACE 13 (1998).
13 For example, "[d]uring seventy years of Soviet rule, the RFE served primarily as a frontier outpost
and raw-materials base for the rest of the country." Thornton & Ziegler, supra note 9, at 4; see also DAVIS,
supra note 10, at 8-22 (describing the historical development of the RFE as primarily a system of military
outposts, prison colonies, and raw-material supplies for European Russia); ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note
11, at 58-76 (demonstrating that for most of the RFE's historical development, investment of capital in
economic development was not a high priority).
14 More than half of the food, consumer goods, and energy during this period were imported from
elsewhere in the Soviet Union and ninety percent of its products were exported to other regions of the
USSR. Thornton & Ziegler, supra note 9, at 6.
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form of higher wages to encourage resettlement to the Far East and to
compensate for the harsh climate and difficult living conditions.' 5  As a
result, after many years of Soviet central planning, the RFE entered the
reform era of the 1990s with distorted structures of costs and production.
16
As the Soviet regime collapsed, subsidies were dramatically reduced or
eliminated, the flow of supplies to the RFE was disrupted, transport costs
rose exponentially, and inflation skyrocketed.17 The RFE lost its traditional
goods and services suppliers, as well as its markets. 18 Entire industries that
owed their existence to state subsidies and distorted prices downsized. 19
Curbed demand for military equipment-the major industrial export of the
RFE-reduced regional machinery production to a fraction of its former
levels.20 Although such economic dislocations occurred nearly everywhere
in Russia during the 1990s, their effects were especially grave in the RFE.2
The disproportionate decline of economic activity in the RFE resulted
in a corresponding decrease in the region's standard of living.22 Although
the RFE's average per capita income still exceeds Russia's national average,
cost of living increases by far outpaced those in the rest of the country.23
Thus, real earnings in the RFE have declined more than in other regions of
Russia.24 The Far East has become one of Russia's most expensive regions
25
with the poorest living conditions.26 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
RFE's population declined nine percent between 1991 and 1997.27
The Russian government has not entirely ignored the region's
IS DAVIS, supra note 10, at 60.
I6 For example, the RFE bought energy and sold raw materials at low domestic prices, acquiring
consumer goods and industrial equipment at relatively high prices, as if it faced implicit import tariffs on
manufacturers and implicit export taxes on its raw materials exports. Id.
17 id.
" Id. at 63.
19 A 1996 study estimating the apparent competitiveness of each Far Eastern industrial sector at
world prices revealed four sectors-fishing, forest products, light industry, and the chemical industry-to
be negative value-added at world prices, and three additional sectors-agriculture, ferrous metals, and
coal--to be unprofitable. See Thornton & Ziegler, supra note 9, at 6.
20 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 61-62; Thornton & Ziegler, supra note 9, at 6-7. Overall industrial
production has declined so much that in the year 2000 it was 44.8% of what it had been in 1990. Nadezhda
Mikhaeeva, Social and Economic Differentiation in the Russian Far East, in THE RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A
REGION AT RISK 88 (Judith Thornton & Charles E. Ziegler eds., 2002).
21 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 61.
" Mikhaeeva, supra note 20, at 97. Although the effects of economic dislocations within the RFE
were highly differentiated, with southern regions retaining more capacity for vital economic activity, the
RFE has seen an overall decline of the living conditions greater than the rest of Russia. See id. at 85-115.
'3 See id. at97.
2 Seeid. at98.
2 Id. at 97.
26 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 62.
27 Id.
VOL. 13 No. 2
RUSSIAN DRArFTLA w ON SEZs
suffering and its need for economic development. As early as 1992, then
President Boris Yeltsin visited the RFE and, appalled by its poor living
conditions, launched a regional economic development program.28  Yet
neither then, nor in 1996 when the idea was revived during the presidential
election, did the funding needed for such development materialize.29 In July
2000, President Vladimir Putin also acknowledged the RFE's acute need for
development, 30 but at the same time recognized that of the fourteen billion
rubles (approximately US$ 503 million) allocated to the region in the 1999
Russian Federation budget, only 1.5 billion rubles (approximately US$ 54
million) were actually spent for the region's benefit.
3
While the Russian economy experienced some overall growth after
the financial crisis of 1998, recovery in the RFE was fragile. 32 Economists
partially attribute this sluggish recovery to the region's weak consumer
sector and geographical distance from European Russia. 33  Yet many
additional factors also explain the slow recovery, including the absence of an
independent court system to uphold contracts, unpredictable and unstable
laws and regulations, confiscatory taxation, widespread public and private
sector corruption, as well as the lack of physical, energy, financial, and
communications infrastructures.34
Thus, the Russian central government's traditional neglect of the RFE
continued well into the 1990s. This pattern suggests that "Russia's Far
Eastern Provinces are the most logical candidates for autonomous
development and decentralized governance."
35
29 Id.
29 id.
30 President Putin remarked with characteristic nationalism that "[i]f we don't make a real effort to
develop Russia's far east, then in the next few decades, the Russian population will be speaking mainly
Japanese, Chinese, and Korean." Thornton & Ziegler, supra note 9, at 7.
31 Id. U.S. dollar values are based on the average Interbank exchange rate during July 2000. See
FXHistory: historical currency exchange rates, July 2000, at http://www.oanda.com/converttfxhistory (last
visited Jan. 25, 2004).
32 Thornton & Ziegler, supra note 9, at 9.
33 Id. at 11.
34 See id. at 27; DAvis, supra note 10, at 63; Sharif M. Shuja, Russia's Northeast Asia Policy:
Challenges and Choices for the 21" Century, MARYLAND SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 17-18 (No.
159, 2000).
33 Menon & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 43. The authors of this conclusion do not advocate separatism.
Rather, they observe that European Russia lacks the necessary resources to develop the RFE's
transportation infrastructure or to invest in modernizing industrial production or the extractive industries
and argue that the region's economic future depends on cooperation with the states of Asia and the Pacific,
including the United States. Id. at 47.
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B. The RFE Merits Investment and an Active Approach to Development
Theoretically, the RFE's economic potential is great. A vast region
covering 6.2 million square kilometers, or thirty-six percent of the territory
of the Russian Federation, it is home to only 7.5 million people, or five
percent of Russia's total population.36 Although the full potential of the
RFE's natural resources has not been thoroughly studied,37 it boasts some of
38 3the world's richest marine resources, oil, gas, 9 other minerals and
nonferrous metals, and timber, as well as unique opportunities for outdoor
recreation. Finally, the RFE's borderland proximity to China, Japan,
Korea, the United States, and important Pacific Rim land and ocean routes
naturally make the development and servicing of international trade an area
of great potential for the region.4 1
In light of its generous resource endowment, the RFE is a great
candidate for regional economic development. As Judith Thornton and
Charles Ziegler argue, "[a] future based on economic openness and capital
market integration could link Russian energy and raw materials with
Japanese capital, U.S. food, technology, and know-how, and Chinese labor
in the transformation of what is potentially the most dynamic region of the
world economy. ' '42 Such aspirations, however, require an active approach
and a serious commitment to promoting investment and development.
Creation of SEZs could well be a part of a serious commitment to
development.
36 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 3.
37 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra, note 11, at 30.
38 Russia's exclusive economic zone in the RFE includes the most productive fishing grounds in the
North Pacific. Alexander S. Sheingauz et al., The Russian Far East's Competitive Position in the
Northeast Asian Markets, in THE RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK 122 (Judith Thornton & Charles E.
Ziegler eds., 2002).
39 Russia possesses the largest supply of natural gas in the world and a great share of the world's oil,
much of which is located in the RFE. Deborah K. Espinosa, Comment, Environmental Regulation of
Russia's Offshore Oil & Gas Industry and Its Implications for the International Petroleum Market, 6 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 647, 648 n. 10 (1997).
40 See generally ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 11, at 30-42; Sheingauz et al., supra note 38, at 119-
27; DAVIS, supra note 10, at 84.
41 See Osnovnye factory investitsionnoi privlekatel'nosti Dal'nego Vostoka i perspektivy ee
povysheniia [Major Factors of Investment Worthiness of the Far East and Prospects for Increasing it],
TKHOOKEANSKIl VESTNIK, May 16, 2002, at *3, at
http://www.npacific.ru/np/gazeta/2002/l/tvIO 61 02_2002.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).42 Thornton & Ziegler, supra note 9, at 3.
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C. Special Economic Zones Are Well-Established Worldwide as
Economic Catalysts
The concept of SEZs defies easy definition. 4 Various terms,
including free enterprise zone, free economic zone, international enterprise
zone, special enterprise zone, export-processing zone, empowerment zone,
technological development zone, and others are often used to designate
SEZs. 44 These terms are not accidental, but rather reflect different
philosophies, objectives, and means of achieving them.
Worldwide, there are between 500 and 1500 SEZs, 4 many of which
are located in the United States.46 Most zones have certain characteristics
that identify them as "special" or "free." Typically these zones distinguish
themselves from other regions by their relaxed tariff, taxation, and
administrative regimes.47 One early definition of the SEZ concept provided:
the term [special economic zone] means a part of the territory
of a State where any goods introduced are generally regarded,
insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being
outside the Customs territory and are not subject to the usual
Customs control.48
Therefore, the term SEZ is best understood as generic, representing a
diverse range of economic regulatory phenomena. In light of this, the most
apt definition of SEZs is that they are "geographically insulated but
economically open areas, where special and flexible economic policies are
carried out primarily to promote foreign investment, technology transfer, and
43 See Xue Sang, Another Special Economic Zone in China - An Analysis of the Special Regulations
and Policy for Shanghai's Pudong New Area, 14 Nw J. INT'L L. & BUS. 130, 132 (1993).
44 See generally Free Trade Areas Give US Firms Access to A World of Markets, J. COM. (March 1,
1999); Jia Shao, Exploration of A Special Enterprise Zone: A Case Study of China - Singapore Suzhou
Industry Park (2001) (unpublished thesis, University of Cincinnati) (on file with author); Xue Sang,
Another Special Economic Zone in China - An Analysis of the Special Regulations and Policy for
Shanghai's Pudong New Area, 14 Nw J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1993); Decision of the Council of Ministers
of the RSFSR No. 359 of June 26, 1991 on Priority Measures for the Development of the Free Economic
Zone Sakhalin (FEZ Sakhalin), June 26, 1991, LEXIS, GARANT 10006303, 2 [hereinafter FEZ Sakhalin
Regulations]. SEZs are not static. Rather, they evolve according to their local needs and advantages. In
the United States, for example, as state legislatures continue to amend existing laws, the concept has
evolved to provide primarily tax and financial incentives as well as regulatory relief to economically
depressed and distressed communities. Shao, supra, at 14-15.
45 See Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7, at * 1.
46 See Shao, supra note 44, at 14.
47 See Sang, supra note 43, at 131-33.
48 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, Sept.
25, 1974, 1974 U.S.T. LEXIS 284, Annex F.1.
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exports." 49 Such areas are popular because they can serve as catalysts for
economic development, empowering communities with tools to identify
solutions for local needs and to improve the lives of their people.50
D. The Kuril Islands Are Ideal Candidates for an Experimental SEZ
Within the RFE region, the chain of tiny islands stretching between
the Kamchatka peninsula and the Japanese island Hokkaido provides an
especially vivid example of the need for economic development. First,
Russia has an interest in maintaining well-developed settlements as a result
of an ongoing territorial dispute with Japan. 51 Second, the islands are
surrounded by some of the richest fishing grounds in the Pacific. 52  Yet
development in the Kuril Islands is virtually non-existent and the life of the
residents is unquestionably meager.
5 3
Some Russian policy-makers have already suggested creation of an
SEZ to develop the Kurils. In 2001 the Russian legislature ("Duma")
49 WEIPING WU, PIONEERING ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: THE
PROMOTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN SHENZHEN 1 (1999).
50 See Shao, supra note 44, at 15-16.
s5 The Kuril chain is a part of the Sakhalin Region of the RFE, but control of the four southernmost
Kuril Islands-Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group-has been hotly contested by Japan
since the Soviet Union seized them in 1946. The author's research of the historical and legal dimensions of
this territorial dispute led to the conclusion that Russian and Japanese legal claims to the islands are equally
strong. Valentin A. Povarchuk, The Unresolved Dispute Over the Northern Territories/Southern Kurils and
Russo-Japanese Relations 79 (2000) (unpublished Senior Honors Thesis, Cornell University) (on file with
author & Cornell University Library). However, uninterrupted possession of a territory and dedication of
resources for its development can solidify a nation's territorial title. See NORMAN HILL, CLAIMS TO
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 156-57 (1945).
52 HARA, supra note 12, at 13.
53 In the early 1990s the Kuril Islands were described as a colony, isolated by several days of travel
from the mainland, nearly devoid of roads, with ports in bad disrepair, and extremely poor housing
conditions. See OLEG BONDARENKO, NEIZVFSTNYE KURiLY [UNKNOWN KURILS] 128, 141, 157, 159
(1992). Remarkably, the situation has only worsened in recent years. After experiencing a devastating
earthquake in 1994, the regidn received very little aid for reconstruction. See TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA, THE
NORTHERN TERRITORIES DISPUTE AND RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 488-89, 491 (1998).
In 2001, the Russian Duma adopted an unusually frank resolution, in which it acknowledged the poor
state of affairs in the Kuril Islands. See Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Soveta
Rossiiskoi Federatsii: 0 sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi obstanovke na Kuril'skikh ostovakh (Sakhalinskaia
oblast') [Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: On social-
economic situation in the Kuril Islands (Sakhalin region)], Sobr. Zakonod. RF 2001, No. 20 available at
http://vff-s.narod.ru/kur/pr/pr02.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Resolution on Socio-
Economic Situation in the Kurils]. The resolution recognized that the socio-economic situation in the
islands was critical, most fishing and fish-processing enterprises were inoperable, post-1994 earthquake
reconstruction was inadequate, healthcare, educational, and housing services were non-existent, and the
government's measures dealing with this crisis were episodic, and not backed up by sufficient funding and
other resources. Id. at "1-2. In addition, Kuril residents suffer from an extremely poor telecommunications
network. See 0. Aleksandrov, Kak dozvonit'sia do Kuril? [How can one reach the Kurils?], SOVETSKII
SAKHALIN No. 165 (Sept. 17, 2003), at http://vff-s.narod.ru/kur/pr/pr06.html#1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
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proposed that the government develop SEZs in the Sakhalin Region,
including a zone in the Kurils.5 4  In the same resolution the Duma also
emphasized the importance of fully implementing the Federal Program of
Socio-Economic Development of the Kuril Islands of Sakhalin Region for
1994-2005 and recommended reconsideration of Kuril Island budgetary
allocations, as well as other measures, to support the local fishing industry
and to curb foreign poaching.
55
Indeed, the Kuril Islands region may be an ideal candidate for an
SEZ.56 Much of the seafood currently extracted from the regional waters is
immediately exported in its raw form.57 In 1998, the region's catch value
exceeded US$ 1.5 billion, but according to some estimates it could have
reached US$ 7 billion had it been processed there. 8 Valuable kelp, which
can be processed for food, pharmaceutical, and cosmetic products, lines the
shores of the Kuril Islands, untouched. 59 A reconstruction of ports,
modernization of the Kuril fishing fleet, and investment in seafood
processing facilities on the Kurils could greatly boost the region's income.
An SEZ on the islands could also provide favorable conditions for
development and help to reinvigorate the fishing, processing, and shipping
industries, thus realizing the advantages inherent in the region's proximity to
abundant resources and the border with Japan.
54 See Resolution on Socio-Economic Situation in the Kurils, supra note 53, at *2.
55 Id.
At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that merely designating the area an SEZ
will not ensure its success. In order for a Kuril SEZ to become a reality, Russian policy-makers must first
resolve the sensitive issue of administrative control over such a zone-a problem that hampered the
previously-proposed SEZ. They must also provide an appropriate legal and physical infrastructure. See
infra Part II.B(3).
57 Data on the relative shares of raw versus processed seafood exports is currently unavailable. This
may be attributable to widespread underreporting of catches, revenues, and profits in the fishing industry.
See Tony Allison, Crisis of the Region's Fishing Industry: Sources, Prospects, and the Role of Foreign
Interests, in THE RussiA's FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK 148 (Judith Thornton & Charles E. Ziegler eds.,
2002). However, there are indicators that processing of marine products is low. See id. at 150 (reporting a
regional industry conference's finding of inadequate level of technology in fish processing as the reason for
the failure to provide competitive seafood products for the export market). In addition, much of the
seafood harvest avoids RFE ports, and therefore processing, due to widespread illegal fishing. See Sabrina
Tavernise, A Violent Death Exposes Fish Piracy in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002. Finally, because of
dilapidated port facilities and fishing fleets, the Kuril fishermen's share in the catch is minimal. See
Mosvka - Kurily - Moskva, iii kak obustroit' Kurily? [Moscow - Kurils - Moscow, or how to develop the
Kurils?], SEVERNAIA PATSIIFiKA No. 1(7) (1999), at *1, at http://www.npacific.ru/np/magazin/l-
99 r/np7012.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
- s Id. at *2.
59 V. Zhelanova, Stanet li raem kuril'skaia zona? [Will the Kuril zone become a paradise?], BIZNES
SAKHALINA No. 21, June 26, 2001, at *2-3, at http://vff-s.narod.ru/kur/pr/prOl.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2003).
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III. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES CAN SERVE AS SUCCESSFUL VEHICLES FOR
DEVELOPMENT WHEN PROVIDED WITH STABILITY AND AUTONOMY
A number of countries have used SEZs to successfully promote
development.6 ° In China, for example, SEZs have proved to be invaluable in
attracting foreign direct investment ("FDI") and hastening economic
reform.6 Policy openness and the ability of local authorities to develop
comprehensive and sophisticated regulations tailored to local conditions
have greatly contributed to the success of SEZs in China.62 Although the
future of Chinese SEZs is uncertain due to World Trade Organization
("WTO") accession commitments, they are likely to remain major centers of
economic activity.63 In Russia, too, creation of SEZs has been conceived as
a means of promoting regional economic development."4 Yet the Russian
SEZs thus far have produced only token economic improvements, if any.
65
A comparison of the Chinese and Russian SEZ experiments isolates the
primary shortcomings of the Russian SEZ approach-lack of stability and
inadequate administrative autonomy.
A. China's Special Economic Zones Have Been Relatively Successful
China has established dozens of SEZs since the early 1980s, attracting
billions of dollars of FDI and generating enormous exports.66 The Shenzhen
SEZ, one of the first in China, owes its success in large part to its openness
to FDI and policy autonomy accorded to the local SEZ leaders.6 v Although
the Chinese government may soon have to revoke preferential tax and
customs treatment in its SEZs, the SEZs are expected to remain major
development centers.68 Thus, the Chinese SEZ experiences can provide
valuable lessons on the utility of SEZs as regional development tools.
60 Shao, supra note 44, at 5, 8-9.
61 Wu, supra note 49, at 7.
62 Id. at 127; Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law:
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
161,255 (2001).
63 SEZs After China's Entering WTO, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 28, 2001, at *3, LEXIS, Nexis
Librar, INTFAX File.
See Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7, at *1.
65 BUTLER, supra note 8, at 611-12.
6 See Julie Walton, Zoning In, 30 CHINA Bus. REv. 24 (Sept. 1, 2003); Jian Zhou, National
Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Study from a Chinese Perspective, 10 ToURO INT'L
L. REv. 39, 52, 60, & 65 (2000).
67 WU, supra note 49, at 127. See infra Part III.B(2), on the meaning of "policy openness and
autonomy."
" SEZ After China's Entering WTO, supra note 63, at *3.
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1. The Chinese Approach to SEZs Has Led to the Creation of Dozens of
Zones and Successes in Attracting FDI
China first designated four SEZs along its southern coast in early
198069 with the primary purpose of experimenting with Western technology
and management techniques. 70 In the initial stages of implementation,
during which local governments had limited authority in approval and
supervision of foreign investment, FDI flows remained relatively limited.7'
As the Chinese central government gradually relinquished control and
provided a legal framework for attracting FDI and the local authorities
gained experience in attracting FDI, investment in the SEZs quickly
increased. In the 1990s, further improvements to the legal environment
and a more open foreign investment policy' helped China to become the
second largest recipient of FDI in the world.
Today, there are dozens of SEZs in China. 7 The four original
national-level SEZs-Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen-and a fifth,
Hainan, are the major zones today.75 The Shenzhen SEZ transformed from
an undeveloped rural community to China's most modem city and a model
of economic efficiency. 76 In terms of attracting FDI, the Shenzhen SEZ
performed beyond central and local government expectations.77 It enjoyed
double-digit growth of industrial output value and, due to relatively high
wages, became a highly desirable place to work.78 While not without some
weaknesses, 79 the SEZ successfully stimulated regional economic activity
and represented a positive experiment in capitalism.
2. The Success of the Shenzhen SEZ Is In Part Attributable to the
Openness and Autonomy of Policy
The primary reason for the significant growth of FDI in Shenzhen has
69 Zhou, supra note 66, at 52. The first four SEZs in China were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and
Xiamen. Id.
70 WU, supra note 49, at 1.
71 This amount was US$ 1.6 billion between 1979 and 1982. Zhou, supra note 66, at 52.
'" Id. at 54-57.
71 Id. at 60.
14 Walton, supra note 66, at 24.
75 SEZ After China's Entering WTO, supra note 63, at *3.
76 WU, supra note 49, at 7.
" Id. at 27.
71 Id. at 123.
79 See id. at 122, 126 (reporting little meaningful technology transfer, no substantial net exports, lack
of significant domestic linkages, and some labor abuses).
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been physical, economic, and cultural proximity to Hong Kong.80  In
addition, policy openness and autonomy, relaxed ownership controls, labor
market flexibility, and preferential fiscal incentives proved to be significant
draws in Shenzhen.
81
In Shenzhen, policy openness and autonomy have translated into
relative freedom in policy-making and socio-economic plan development by
local zone authorities. 8 2  For example, allowing this type of autonomy
permitted local retention of SEZ fiscal revenue for investment in
infrastructure and in investor services. 8 3  The SEZ administration also
retained authority to develop an advanced independent regulatory scheme. 4
One author cites the development of such a unique local regulatory regime
as an example of successful local solutions to local problems. Such policX6
openness and autonomy, in fact, characterized other Chinese SEZs as well. 6
SEZ laws and regulations occupy an important place in the hierarchy of
Chinese legislation. 7 Thus, the role of policy openness and autonomy in the
success of the SEZs cannot be overestimated.
3. China's SEZs Will Likely Remain Centers of Development Despite
WTO Accession
The future of Chinese SEZs is somewhat uncertain due to China's
WTO accession.88 Several commentators have suggested that after China
opens its investment regime, as required by the terms of its WTO accession,
the SEZs' status will no longer be "special. 8 9  Indeed, China plans to
abolish the tax and customs preferences given to newly-established foreign-
so See id. 49-50.
81 Id. at 127. Policy openness and autonomy appear second in the list of attractive factors, while
fiscal incentives are toward the end of this list. Although the author does not explicitly rank these factors
of investment attractiveness, their sequential discussion throughout the book strongly suggests that the list
of factors is hierarchical.
82 WU, supra note 49, at 56-57.
83 Id. at 56.
84 Over time, the zones have actually acquired a complete system of policies and regulations similar
to those in a market system. Id. at 57.
85 Peerenboom, supra note 62, at 255.
86 See Zhou, supra note 66, at 153 n.66.
87 In the official hierarchy of Chinese legislation, SEZ laws and regulations occupy a fourth place out
of six, right after administrative regulations passed by the State Council, and before the rules passed by the
provincial governments. See Peerenboom, supra note 62, at 264 n.216.
ga SEZs After China's Entering WTO, supra note 63, at *1.
89 See id. (reporting a debate among economists and Chinese government officials on whether SEZs
can continue to be "special" after China's entry into the WTO); Wu, supra note 49, at 132; Walton, supra
note 66, at 54; George 0. White I, Enter the Dragon: Foreign Direct Investment Laws and Policies in the
P.R..C., 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 35, 55-56 (2003).
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funded firms and financial companies located in SEZs.90
China's preferential tax and customs policy readjustments seek to
ensure uniformity of domestic law rather than eliminate the SEZs altogether.
Under the relevant WTO obligations contained in its Accession Protocol,
China is obligated to apply all its laws, regulations and other measures of the
central and local governments in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner,
and to revise its local laws and regulations to conform to the WTO
Agreement and the Protocol. 9' Specifically, the Protocol's subsection on
Special Economic Areas requires China to notify the WTO of all laws,
regulations and other measures relating to such areas, and to apply the same
import restrictions, customs and tariff charges to products introduced into
special economic areas as to other parts of its customs territory. 92  The
Protocol, however, does not prohibit preferential SEZ arrangements per se,
but rather requires China to observe the principles of non-discrimination and
national treatment in their implementation.93
Thus, China's obligations to readjust preferential SEZ tax and
customs policies stem from special commitments in its Protocol of
Accession, rather than generally applicable WTO law. It is unclear whether
generally applicable WTO law prohibits the provision of preferential tax and
customs treatment in SEZs. Nonetheless, the Chinese government and
certain commentators do not believe that the revocation of tax and tariff
preferences will completely disrupt Chinese SEZs.94 Behind this optimism
is their recognition of the SEZs as leaders in market reform, investment
attractiveness, and technological innovation, and the expectation of
flexibility in redefining their roles and adapting to new circumstances. 95
90 See MOF to Annul Preferential Tax Policy on Newly Established Foreign Firms in Special
Economic Zones, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 13, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File; SEZs
After China's Entering WTO, supra note 63, at *3.
91 See Accession of the People's Republic of China, WTO Doc. No. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001),
available at http://docsonine.wto.org/DDFDocuments/tWT/J/432.doc (last visited Jan. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter Protocol]. Under the subsection on Uniform Administration, the Protocol provides: "The
provisions of the WTO Agreement and this Protocol should be applied to the entire customs territory of
China, including border trade regions and minority autonomous areas, Special Economic Zones, open
coastal cities, economic and technical development zones and other areas where special regimes for tariffs,
taxes and regulations are established (collectively referred to as "special economic areas")." Id. at *2.
9' See id.
93 See id. ("Except as otherwise provided for in the Protocol, in providing preferential arrangements
for enterprises within such special economic areas, the WTO provisions on non-discrimination and national
treatment shall be fully observed.")
94 See SEZs After China's Entering WTO, supra note 63, at *1 ("[I]n the future, the five
SEZs... expect to maintain the posture of spearheading technological innovation and industrial
upgrading"); Wu, supra note 49, at 132-36 (discussing the post-WTO-accession future of Shenzhen SEZ).
9See SEZs After China's Entering WTO, supra note 63, at *3.
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4. Chinese SEZs Demonstrate that SEZ's Can Successfully Promote
Development
The experience of Chinese SEZs demonstrates that local economic
development is a byproduct of SEZs. Chinese SEZs were originally
established to experiment with Western technology and management
techniques.96 But the massive inflow of FDI that SEZs such as Shenzhen
attracted led to enormous increases in economic activity and creation of
relatively high-paid employment. 97 Indeed, the Chinese experiment with
capitalism turned into a major boon to the local economy.
B. Russian SEZ and SEZ Proposals to Date Have Not Been Successful
Due to Inadequate Infrastructure and an Unstable Legal, Political,
and Economic Climate
The Soviet Union and the predecessor of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic ("RSFSR") began establishing
SEZs in the RFE in the early 1990s. 9" By 1996, eighteen SEZs had been
legislatively established, but the great majority of them were never
functional. 99 In fact, Nakhodka and Kaliningrad were the only two zones
that operated on a significant scale.' 00 The failures of the Russian SEZs
have been attributed to the lack of customs legislation and conflicts between
normative acts used to establish the zones and certain other Russian laws. 1°1
While undoubtedly true, these technical reasons do not fully account for the
reasons why most Russian Far East SEZs never gained momentum.
As attempts to create SEZs in Nakhokda, Sakhalin, and the Kuril
Islands demonstrated, the absence of an open and predictable legal
infrastructure, political and economic instability, and inadequacy of physical
infrastructure also assist in explaining these failures. The first Russian SEZ
96 See Wu, supra note 49, at 1.
9' See id. at 123.
" See BuTLER, supra note 8, at 610-11. The 1991 Law on Foreign Investments in the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic ("RSFSR') included enabling provision for the FEZs. Id. Shortly
thereafter, the President of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, the Supreme Soviet of the
RSFSR, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR issued declarations establishing various
FEZs. Id. at611.
99 Id. at 611-12.
'oo Id. at 612. There may be a significant exception to the failures of SEZs in the RFE in the making
in Magadan Region, one of the northerly provinces of the RFE. Sue Davis reports that Governor Valentin
Tsvetkov fought Moscow for a free economic zone for Magadan and finally won in 1999. DAViS, supra
note 10, at 46. This zone is now "widely credited for improving the economy of Magadan and for the
governor's reelection." Id. However, information about it is otherwise scarce.
'' Id. at611.
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in Nakhodka still formally exists today, but continues to furnish little
economic progress, primarily due to unstable legislation on its tax and
customs benefits and poor infrastructure. 10 2  The Sakhalin SEZ failed to
materialize because the enabling legislation failed to provide numerous
critical details, including its territorial scope. 10 3 In addition, there was much
uncertainty about its economic feasibility and desirability, and little political
commitment to its establishment.'1 4 Finally, the draft law proposing the
establishment of the SEZ in the Kuril Islands fell victim to political struggles
for control.1
0 5
1. The Nakhodka SEZ Failed Due to the Instability of Legislation and
the Absence of Necessary Legal and Transportation Infrastructure
The Soviet Union's first SEZ was in Nakhodka. 106 There were
persuasive justifications for its establishment: Nakhodka and its adjacent
territories constituted the largest transportation hub in the RFE, containing
major commercial cargo, oil-loading, and fishing ports. 10 7 The Nakhokda
SEZ was created by the Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of
October 24, 1990108 and the Decision of the Council of Ministers of the
RFSR that promulgated its regulations.'09
102 See ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 11, at 258-59.
103 See generally FEZ Sakhalin Regulations, supra note 44, at 7.
0o4 See Y. Babak, Sakhalin During the Epoch of Hopes, SOVDATA DIALINE - BIZEKON NEWS, Oct 18,
1991, LEXIS, Nexis Library, SBE File; Vladimir Orlov, Portrait of a Governor in the Dark,
MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, Dec. 29, 1992, LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File, at *1; Alexei Baliyev, Our
FEZ Put To Doubt, RUSDATA DIALINE- BIZEKON NEWS, Sept. 21, 1994, LEXIS, Nexis Library, SBE File.
105 See MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, THE CHECHEN WARS: WILL RUSSIA GO THE WAY OF THE SOVIET
UNION? 118-19 (2002).
106 PRImoRsKI KRAi (MARITIME TERRITORY] 44 (S. Kungurova, ed., R. Thomas, trans., 1994).
107 Russian economic planners of the early 1990s viewed Nakhodka as a "window" to the Asian-
Pacific region. See ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 11, at 258-59. Nakhodka handled sixty-five percent of
the annual cargo turnover in the Far East, and had rail and road links to the Trans-Siberian Railway and
majorparts of the RFE. See id. at 259.
S08 Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of October 24, 1990 on the Creation of a Free
Economic Zone in the Area of Nakhodka, Primoriye Territory, Oct. 24, 1990, LEXIS, GARANT 10000563.
This document merely proclaimed the creation of the Free Economic Zone "with tax rebates and customs
facilities and a simplified procedure for export and import operations," purported to guarantee investors'
rights against nationalization, and delegated the responsibility for approving FEZ regulations to the Council
of Ministers of the RSFSR. See id. at *1-2.
'09 Decision of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation No. 540 of November 23, 1990 on
Priority Measures to Develop the Free Economic Zone in the Area of Nakhodka (Nakhodka FEZ) of the
Primoriye Territory, Nov. 23, 1990, LEXIS, GARANT 10001122 [hereinafter FEZ Nakhodka Regulations].
The FEZ Nakhodka Regulations and the decision promulgating it are relatively brief documents, containing,
respectively, twelve and thirty-three paragraphs that delegate responsibilities for submitting proposals for
new procedures, developing regulations, and assisting each other in setting up the FEZ to twenty USSR-
level, Russian Federation-level, and local administrative bodies.
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Unfortunately, the success of Nakhodka SEZ remains limited. By
1996, the majority of Russian and foreign experts noted that there had been
no major changes in the social and economic development of the zone or in
its impact on the economy of the entire Far East. 110 Nakhodka's ports
experienced a sharp decline in cargo turnover and most piers converted to
timber export."' Towards the end of the 1990s, however, the zone boasted
almost four thousand enterprises, including over three hundred foreign and
joint Russian-foreign companies. 112 Two large-scale economic projects
were initiated and received some investment: a Russian-Korean technology
park, and a Russian-American industrial complex.1 3  Nevertheless, U.S.
State Department analysts maintain that, while the current Nakhodka SEZ
continues to exist on paper, it has had no economic impact.14
The Nakhodka SEZ has not produced the anticipated economic
growth for a number of reasons. First, the region's existing infrastructure
needs significant improvements." 5 For example, only thirteen percent of the
roadways have an improved hard surface.' 6 In addition, many railways
consist of only a single set of tracks and also require improvements.117 Yet
infrastructure upgrading depends primarily on the SEZ's own funds and
funds from abroad.' 
18
In addition to the poor infrastructure, the transport rates from the
Nakhodka SEZ on the Trans-Siberian railroad rose significantly during the
1990s. 1 9 The rises were partially attributable to the imposition of customs
duties in derogation of the Nakhodka SEZ Regulations. 20 Shippers have
also suffered from long travel times, theft on the Trans-Siberian railroad, and
an uncooperative customs service. 121 Threats to the personal security of
business people have also plagued the region.
22
The primary cause of the Nakhodka SEZ's failure to produce its
..0 See ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 11, at 258.
1 Mark Whitehouse, Far East Free Zone Not Free of Trouble, MosCow TIMES, July 26, 1997,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MOSTMS File, at *1.
112 See Information, Administrative Committee of FEZ Nakhokda, June 22, 1999,
http://fez.nakhodka.r/newpagel.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
113 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 11, at 264.
114 INTERNATIONAL MARKET INSIGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REF. No. STATE 128494, RuSSLA: 2003
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT, 85 (2003).
.. See ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 11, at 259.
116 See id.
117 See id.
" See id. at260.
119 Seeid. at258.
120 See id.
121 Whitehouse, supra note I 11, at *1.
122 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 11, at 263.
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desired economic effects is the lack of stability in the legislation and
regulation of the zone itself. 23  Several significant shifts in policies and
legislation have negatively affected the SEZ.124 The Russian government's
frequent vacillations about granting benefits to the Nakhodka SEZ's
enterprises reflects its concern about the uncontrolled proliferation of free
economic zones that developed in the mid-1990s.125 This concern may have
been well-founded in the case of Nakhodka. Through much of the 1990s,
Primorskii Krai, the territory in which the zone is located, was governed by
Evgenii Nazdratenko, who earned a rtutation as one of the most corrupt
governors in the Russian Federation, 26 and refused to support any SEZ
measures that did not directly enhance his political standing. 27 Even after
President Yeltsin's decree on development of the Russian-Korean industrial
complex, 128 the project languished for several years due to corruption and
political infighting between Nazdratenko and the former administrator of the
zone Sergei Dudnik. 129 Thus, corruption and infighting made Russian
lawmakers extremely wary of extending significant benefits to the zone and
contributed to its lack of administrative and regulatory stability.
'2 See id. at 258.
124 In January 1992, the Russian Duma effectively cancelled the joint enterprise tax benefits by
enacting a law "On the Fundamentals of the Tax System." See A. V. Samokhvalov, Svobodnyie
ekonomicheskie zony v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: problemy sozdaniia i funktsionirovaniia [Free Economic
Zones in the Russian Federation: The problems of creation and operation], table 1, (1997) (unpublished
thesis, Financial Academy of the Government of Russian Federation) at
http://antitax.ru/offshorems/info/ref04.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). Then, in 1993, the Duma
eliminated the custom tariff preferences and effectively eliminated all tax benefits retroactively, beginning
to assess taxes for the previous two years. See id.; ECONOMIC SuRVEY, supra note 11, at 258. In 1994,
however, the Russian government instructed the Ministry of Finance to grant tax credits to the local
authorities until the year 2000, and requested a number of ministries to consider the proposals of the local
authorities regarding the creation of free customs zones and industrial complexes. See Decision of the
Government of the Russian Federation No. 1033 on Some Measures to Develop the Nakhodka Free
Economic Zone, Sept. 8, 1994, LEXIS, GARANT 10001648 [hereinafter Nakhodka Development
Decision]. The following year the law "On financing of state expenditures" once again cancelled all the tax
benefits, and a later law cancelled all benefits for participants in international trade. See Samokhvalov,
supra, table 1. Finally, in 1996, after an official visit to South Korea, President Boris Yeltsin decreed that
his government sign an agreement with Korea regarding the establishment of a free trade zone with the
possibility of free customs regime in Nakhodka. See Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No.
345 on Some Measures for Promoting the Investment Activity in the Free Economic Zone Nakhodka, Mar.
9,1996, LEXIS, GARANT 10005929.
125 Whitehouse, supra note 111, at *2.
226 See DAVIS, supra note 10, at 53.
227 EVANGELISTA, supra note 105, at 116.
1 See Nakhokda Development Decision, supra note 124.
129 See Elizabeth Wishnick, Regional Dynamic in Russia's Asia Policy, in RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A
REGION AT RISK, supra note 3, at 308.
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2. The Sakhalin SEZ Failed Due to Inadequate Legislative Provisions,
Doubts About its Economic Feasibility and Desirability, and Lack of
Political Commitment
Although the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR decided to create an
SEZ in the Sakhalin Region in 1991,130 the zone never formally materialized
for a variety of reasons. First, the SEZ Sakhalin Regulations merely
provided a skeletal framework for the establishment of a free economic
zone. 13' Absent from this document are detailed provisions on further rule-
making procedures, administrative governance, and even precise territorial
limits of the zone. 132  Still loyal to the long-standing traditions of central
planning, the SEZ Sakhalin Regulations entrusted the development of these
provisions to a large number of administrative bodies,' 33 many of which
were subsequently embroiled in radical transformation. 134 It is not
surprising, therefore, that many of the determinations, rules, proposals, and
procedures necessary for the functioning of this SEZ were never developed.
To a great extent the Sakhalin SEZ's fate was originally sealed by
doubts about its economic feasibility and subsequently about its very
economic desirability. Such doubts arose soon after the proclamation of the
Sakhalin SEZ. 13  In the early-to-mid-1990s, the Sakhalin Region was ill-
prepared to become a bustling center of economic activity due to poorly
developed infrastructure, hyperinflation, the prevalence of barter as a
primary payment system, and no system of private ownership of the means
of production. 136 Later in the 1990s, however, Western oil and gas
130 See FEZ Sakhalin Regulations, supra note 44. The decision of the Council of Ministers that
promulgated regulations for FEZ Sakhalin contains nineteen paragraphs, most of which distribute
responsibilities for providing further legislative and regulatory framework among numerous federal-level
bureaucracies, sometimes in cooperation with local Sakhalin authorities. See id. The regulations consist of
forty-three articles attached to this decision. Among other things, these articles describe the purpose of
FEZ Sakhalin (art. 2), provide for a preferential tax and customs treatment (art. 4), assign administration
responsibilities to FEZ Sakhalin Administration (art. 6), specify tax rate concessions (arts. 18-20), and
provide for a tax credit to Sakhalin Region (art. 28). See id.
:3 See generally id.
132 id.
133 FEZ Sakhalin Regulations named twenty-three administrative and policy-making bodies, twenty
of which were RSFSR (national) level bodies. Id.
134 See Robert Skidelsky, The State and Economy: Reflections on the Transition from Communism to
Capitalism in Russia, in POST-COMMUNISM: FOUR PERSPECTIVES 77, 80 (Michael Mandelbaum, ed., 1996)
(noting that many institutional features of the modem capitalist state have had to be invented from scratch
in the new Russia).
135 See Babak, supra note 104 (reporting high consumer prices, growing shortages, and lack of
investor interest).
136 The author resided on Sakhalin Island until mid-1992 and can vividly recall long lines, lack of
electricity, small entrepreneurs buying construction equipment with rubbing alcohol, roads washed out by
typhoon-like rains, and the surprise of people at the idea of private ownership of a truck or an apartment.
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producers began seeking links to the newly privatized Russian oil companies
and the rich hydrocarbon deposits off the Sakhalin shelf.'37 Despite the
great degree of uncertainty generated by Russia's vague property rights, lack
of law enforcement, and unclear guidelines on compliance with
environmental standards, several large Western oil companies contributed
hundreds of millions of dollars into Sakhalin's offshore oil projects,
believing that "the biggest risk is the risk of not being there."' 38 As a result,
Sakhalin today is one of the largest FDI recipients in the Russian
Federation. 39 Due to the allure of Sakhalin's oil and gas, the late Sakhalin
Governor Igor Farkhudinov 140 successfully extracted investors' concessions
to build a new highway, onshore processing plants, pipelines, improved port
facilities, and to train Russian engineers. 141 One scholar argues that
Sakhalin has good economic prospects and will fare better than much of the
RFE because oil, gas, and substantial investment will provide jobs, incomes,
and taxes for the region. 42 Given that these benefits are the typical products
of a successful SEZ, one could question whether an SEZ encompassing the
entire region is even necessary for its development.
The failure to define a limited territorial scope of the would-be
Sakhalin SEZ, however, was likely its most fatal flaw. The first governor of
the region sent mixed signals about his intent to develop an SEZ, and was
criticized for his failure to submit a detailed plan for the SEZ. 143 By the time
the regional administration submitted such a proposal in 1994, it was too late.
The proposal was rejected,' 44 likely due to the same fear of losing control
and lack of commitment to the SEZ concept that prompted the central
government to revoke the tax privileges of Nakhodka SEZ.
137 Judith Thornton, Sakhalin Energy: Problems and Prospects, in RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT
RISK, supra note 3, at 165, 170.
138 See Espinosa, supra note 39, at 681; Judith Thorton, Sakhalin Energy: Problems and Prospects, in
RUSSIA'S FAR EAST: A REGION AT RISK, supra note 3, at 167.
,39 One in every four dollars of FDI in Russia goes to Sakhalin. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 82.
40 Igor P. Farkhudinov recently died in a helicopter crash in the northern part of the Kuril Islands
chain. See Steven Lee Myers, No Survivors Found in Wreckage of Russian Copter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2003, at 3.
141 DAVIS, supra note 10, at 82. Thus, Sakhalin Island is currently seeing some development due to
foreign investment in the oil projects, but without formal SEZ status.
142 Id. at 83.
143 Specifically, there were no plans for a special tax status, duty-free imports of goods, openness to
other countries, changes in the banking system, and specification of a small area of land for the FEZ. See
Orlov, supra note 104, at *1.
' See Baliyev, supra note 104.
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3. The Draft Law on SEZ Kurils Was Never Enacted Because It Was a
Victim of Political Struggles for Control
The Draft Law on SEZ Kurils finds its genesis in the Federal Program
of Socio-Economic Development of Kuril Islands. 145 Although it
represented a somewhat more sophisticated drafting effort than regulations
for the Nakhodka and Sakhalin SEZs, 146 and enjoyed the support of the
Duma deputies from the Sakhalin Region, 147 it remained in its draft form,
and was never considered by the entire Duma.
The Draft Law on SEZ Kurils fell victim to a political control struggle.
The second governor of Sakhalin, Igor Farkhudinov, opposed the creation of
the Kuril SEZ, insisting that the SEZ cover the entire Sakhalin Region.
148
He argued that creating a special status for the Kurils was a prelude to
partitioning the region and eventually ceding the disputed territories to
Japan. 149 But Farkhudinov also expressed his blunt disagreement with the
idea that the SEZ should be administered from Moscow.' 5  Thus, a veritable
struggle over control of the Sakhalin Region's territories ensued and became
the major factor obstructing the adoption of the Draft Law on SEZ Kurils
145 See Proekt: Rossiiskaia Federatsiia: Federal'nyi Zakon ob Osoboi Ekonomicheskoi Zone na
territorii Kuril'skikh ostrovov Sakhalinskoi oblasti [Draft Federal Law on Special Economic Zone on the
Territory of the Kuril Islands of Sakhalin Region] at http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/078646GD.SHTM (last
viewed Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Draft Law on SEZ Kurils], art. 2.1. First adopted on December 17,
1993, the program's original term of duration was "1994-1995 and up to 2000," but was later extended to
2005. See Federal'naia tselevaia programma "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Kuri'skikh ostrovov
Sakhalinskoi oblast (1994-2005 gody)" [Comprehensive Federal Program "Socio-economic development
of the Kuril islands of Sakhalin region (1994-1995)"] at http://vff-s.narod.ru/kur/pr/index.htnl (last visited
Oct. 24, 2003) at *5.
146 See generally Draft Law on SEZ Kurils, supra note 145. The draft law was introduced to the State
Duma on December 23, 1998, by the Ministry of Regional Policy, Interministerial Commission on
Implementation of the Federal Program of Socio-Economic Development of the Kuril Islands, and the
Institute of Macroeconomic Research at the Ministry of Economics. See Resolution on Socio-Economic
Situation in the Kurils, supra note 53, at ?3. The definition section limits the territorial scope of SEZ
Kurils to the Kuril Islands chain and excludes territories with strategic or defense significance. See Draft
Law on SEZ Kurils, supra note 145, art. 1.1. Twenty-three articles of this draft law and numerous
subsections provide for the waiver of customs export and import duties, see id. art. 5, relaxation of currency
controls, see id., art. 6, various tax breaks, see id. art. 7, licensing of foreign banks, see id. art. 11, a
simplified regime of exit-entry and stay of Russian and foreign nationals, see id. art. 19, and other benefits.
This draft law also contains more detailed provisions on administration of the zone and responsibilities of
the administrative bodies, see id. arts. 13-15, registration of the residents of the zone, see id. art. 9, as well
as development funding of SEZ Kurils, see id. art. 18, and termination of the status of SEZ Kurils, see id.
art. 23.
147 See Sakhalin Governor Says President Agreed With His Proposals On Free Economic Zone In
Region, RosBUSINESSCONSULTING DATABASE, Aug. 4, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, RBC File.
48 See Sakhalin Chiefs Want Special Zone to Embrace All Region, ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Feb.
21, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
149 EVANGEUSTA, supra note 105, at 118-19.
"So Sakhalin Chiefs Want Special Zone to Embrace All Region, supra note 148.
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and any action on the Sakhalin SEZ.151
C. Comparison of Chinese and Russian SEZs Reveals That China's
Model Provides Greater Stability, More Autonomy, and Better
Infrastructure
While direct comparisons between SEZs are difficult, several key
differences between the Chinese and Russian SEZs explain their contrasting
levels of success. To discover such differences it is important to disregard
the unique factors that attract investors in each SEZ. Aside from its
proximity to Hong Kong, the Shenzhen SEZ in China-unlike its Russian
counterparts-enjoys relative legal, economic, and political stability. The
Chinese government clearly signaled its commitment to market-oriented
policies within the SEZs, and legislatively mandated that local authorities
develop their own policies and regulations. 152 Chinese SEZs, such as
Shenzhen, escaped the hyperinfiation, barter, and economic dislocations of
perestroika, which enabled them to serve as catalysts for China's steady
economic growth. 153 Their economic success enabled significant
infrastructure development, thereby increasing their investment allure.
15 4
In contrast to the Chinese SEZs, Russian Far East SEZs lacked
stability and infrastructure. They arose during a period of major Russian
social, economic, and political upheaval. 155 Their enabling laws and
regulations were incomplete, leaving most details to be filled in by
numerous bureaucracies and resulting in an unclear division of powers in the
151 Fear of losing control of the regions apparently played an important role in preventing the
realization of the SEZs in the RFE. See supra Parts Ul.B(l), Ill.B(2). Throughout the 1990s it was feared
that the RFE may move toward re-establishment of the Far Eastern Republic, an independent state that
existed briefly in the RFE during the 1920s. See DAVIS, supra note 10, at 15, 58. Thus, maintaining the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation became a vital security concern for Russian politicians across
the political spectrum. Menon & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 45. In response, President Vladimir Putin has
made significant efforts to recentralize power after its devolution to the regions during the Yeltsin
administration. See DAVIS, supra note 10, at 57. However, fear of secession is not a legitimate objection to
the establishment of SEZs. Matthew Evangelista argues persuasively that the Far Eastern regions as well as
other regions of Russia presumed by politicians to be at risk for secession were in no great rush to secede.
See EVANGELISTA, supra note 105, at 113-23. Other commentators agree that the exercise of certain
autonomy by the RFE regions is unlikely to threaten Russia's integrity. See Menon & Ziegler, supra note 3,
at 46; DAVIS, supra note 10, at 58. Rather, Putin's attempts to recentralize power seem to have done little
more than add another layer ofbureaucracy. See DAVIS, supra note 10, at 32.
1:2 Zhou, supra note 66, at 54-57.
"s3 See id. at 53-54, 59-60.
:54 See WU, supra note 49, at 56.
155 See generally Robert Skidelsky, The State and Economy: Reflections on the Transition from
Communism to Capitalism in Russia, in POST-COMMUNISM: FOUR PERSPECTIVES, supra note 134, at 77-
100.
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zones' administration. 156  Local Russian leaders often saw the SEZs as
opportunities to expand their authority, rather than opportunities for
economic development, and engaged in counterproductive struggles for
control. 5 7  The economic dislocations of perestroika also hit hard in the
areas in which SEZs were created or proposed, making investments in them
unattractive and leaving few resources for infrastructure improvement. 58
Any new legislation on SEZs in Russia would necessarily have to
remedy these problems in order to increase the likelihood of success. The
experience of the Chinese SEZs suggests that Russian policy-makers must,
to the extent feasible, first provide a predictable legal, political, and
economic environment, as well as insure investment in physical
infrastructure, in order for the SEZs to flourish in the RFE. In addition,
future Russian SEZs, like the SEZs in China, would benefit from greater
openness and autonomy.
The Chinese SEZ model is not directly transferable to Russia. The
SEZ in Shenzhen, for example, benefited from the region's historically hard-
working, entrepreneurial spirit and its close proximity to trade routes. 59 But
even if Russian SEZs cannot replicate the Chinese SEZs, they would be
more successful if managed by responsible local authorities 160 rather than by
centralized control. 161
:56 See supra Parts III.A. 1, 2.
57 See supra Parts III.A.I, 3.
s See supra Parts ILA, II.D.
59 E-mail from Veronica Taylor, Professor of Law and Director of Asian Law Center, University of
Washington School of Law, to Valentin Povarchuk (Jan. 16, 2004) (on file with author). Although certain
significant cultural and geographic differences exist between south-eastern China and the RFE, there are
also commonalities. For example, Nakhodka is located at the intersection of major trade routes between
Europe and Asia. See supra Part LI.B. 1. The RFE territories also have many well-educated local
entrepreneurs, and many hardworking, honest citizens. See DAVIS, supra note 10, at 4.
'6 This argument assumes control by local officials who are primarily interested in promoting local
economic development rather than pursuing short-term personal gains. Unfortunately, this may be the most
vulnerable assumption. Corruption is a malady widely shared by all regions of the RFE as well as all of
Russia. See id. at 55. Accordingly, policy openness as well as stable laws and predictable law enforcement
are vital for the success of the SEZs in the Far East. Fortunately, President Putin and his administration
have made the establishment of the rule of law one of their primary domestic objectives. See Judith
Thornton & Charles E. Ziegler, The Russian Far East in Perspective, in THE RussIA's FAR EAST: A
REGION AT RISK, supra note 3, at 14.161 See supra Part H.A.
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IV. THE DRAFT LAW IS A PROMISING APPROACH AND AvoIDs CONFLICT
wrH RussIA's FuTuRE WTO OBLIGATIONS
The Draft Law is not the first attempt to pass a national SEZ law in
Russia. 162 It does, however, appear to address numerous problems
associated with previous SEZ-related laws and the ad hoc SEZ formation
approach practiced in Russia to date. 163  Its drafters, intent on avoiding
repetition of past Russian SEZ failures, have correctly identified the
necessary conditions for success and set the right priorities in designing SEZ
attributes. 164 For example, the Draft Law provides for uniform SEZ
formation procedures, strict SEZ benefit limits, precise territorial limits, and
a guarantee against adverse legal changes. 165 Finally, the Draft Law avoids
conflict with Russia's future WTO obligations because it does not provide
for export-contingent or actionable subsidies. 1
66
A. The New Approach of the Drafters Is Based on Research
The new Draft Law was developed by the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade of the Russian Federation ("MEDT"?. 167 It is
accompanied by draft amendments to the Russian Tax Code 68 and the
drafters' explanatory Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs. 169  MEDT
finished the development of the law in January 2003 and secured the
approval of all concerned agencies, except for the Ministry of Finance.17 0 In
162 The Duma website contains an undated previous draft law on free economic zones. See Proekt:
Rossiiskaia Federatsiia: Federal'nyi Zakon ob Svobodnykh Ekonomicheskikh Zonakh v Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [Draft Federal Law on Free Economic Zones in the Russian Federation], at
http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PROEKT/079292gd.shtm (last viewed Oct. 10, 2003). The Duma passed this Draft
Law and the Federation Council approved it, but President Putin vetoed in the summer of 2000 citing
violation of federal laws, including custom and tax codes. See Olga Kuznetsova, Svobodnyie
Ekonomicheskiie Zany [Free Economic Zones], ROSSIISKII REGIONAL'NYI BULLETEN', Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jan.
29, 2001) at http://www.nsn.net.rufid=1259&ch=4&sub10 (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) at *1.
163 See generally Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6.
,64 See Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7, at *34.
166 See Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, arts. 5-10, 22.
16 See generally id.
167 See id.
168 Proekt: Rossiiskaia Federatsiia: Federal'nyi Zakon o vnesenii dopolnenii v chast' vtoruiu
Nalogovogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii i v Zakon Rossiiskoi [sic] "0 naloge na imushchestvo
predpriiatii" [Draft Federal Law amending part II of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and the Law
of the Russian [sic] "On taxation of the property of enterprises"] at http://www.economy.gov.ru/merit/75
(last visited Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Appendix B, Tax Code Amendments]. An English version of
these draft amendments iranslated by the author appears in Appendix B.
16 See Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7.
170 See Economics Ministry to Submit Bill on Special Economic Zones in February, INTERFAX NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 28, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File, at * 1.
APRIL 2004
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
late July, the Finance Ministry still opposed the Draft Law, citing a negative
impact on Russia's investment climate, adverse effects on the revenue part
of the national budget, and potential violations of WTO norms. 171
Nevertheless, it is likely that the Draft Law or an amended form of it will be
adopted sometime in 2004.172
The Draft Law's Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs reveals that,
at the very least, the drafters have methodically researched the successes and
failures of SEZs in Russia and other countries. 173  It briefly surveys the
experience of SEZs worldwide, identifies the problems associated with
Russian SEZs of the 1990s, and concludes that effective realization of SEZ
advantages requires:
Formation of an official SEZ policy that considers the
economic interests of the local (regional) and federal authorities;
Development and adoption of an appropriate legal and
regulatory framework, which would regulate the creation,
operation, and termination of SEZ status;
Creation of SEZs in limited, defmed territories with prescribed
limits on their residents, to prevent violation of the uniformity
of the national customs territory and competition for business
activity with other economic units of the state;
The ability (and willingness) of federal and regional authorities
to direct funds to create an appropriate infrastructure with the
understanding that real benefits may accrue only in the future;
171 See Finance Ministry Opposes Inclusion of Special Tax and Customs Regime Into Law on Special
Economic Zones, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, July 22, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File, at *1.
172 The head of MEDT, Minister German Gref, is actively lobbying for adoption of the Draft Law as
one of the means of achieving higher economic growth. Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Boris Alyoshin
expected a compromise in August or September of 2003; after this the bill could be introduced to the Duma
and eventually passed in 2004. See Russia Working on Law on Special Economic Zones, INTERFAX NEWS
AGENCY, June 30, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File. In the early August conference between
Alyoshin, Gref, and Finance Minister Kudrin, the chief opponent of the bill, Kudrin found himself
"caught.. . in a pair of pincers," as Alyoshin proposed provisional creation of five to seven SEZs and using
them to work out the regulatory framework. See Aleksei Kudrin, German Gref and Boris Alyoshin
Organize an Interzonal Tournament, KOMMERSANT, July 1, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
President Putin, in principle, favors the creation of SEZs as a means of assisting the region's development.
In fact, he tasked Minister Gref with developing SEZ legislation in 2000. See Putin Wants Gref to Make
Production Sharing Agreements Work, ITAR-TASS, Aug. 1, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
Finally, Russia's Duma had passed SEZ legislation in the past, see supra note 162, and being especially
pliant to President Putin's wishes today, is likely to do so again.
173 See generally Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7.
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* Equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors and
provision of more advantageous business conditions than
investors possess abroad and in other parts of the country. 174
In addition, the Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs appropriately
recognizes that tax benefits should be neither the sole, nor the primary factor
in attracting investment. 175 In the opinion of the drafters, the principal
advantage of the zones lies in the maximum predictability of long-term
expenses of conducting business. 176 In this regard, the drafters prioritize the
following benefits:
Administrative stimulus, including simpler registration,
certification, inspection, and immigration procedures, as well as
elimination of certain licensing requirements and provision of
the right to buy land upon which improvements are made;
Additional guarantees of static SEZ rules, including the
government's guarantee not to change the rules;
Investments in the infrastructure of the SEZ from the federal
and local budgets;
Customs benefits, including simplified and expedited import
and export procedures, and the possible creation of a free
customs zone regime for goods imported into the SEZ for
production of export goods; and
Possible provision of tax benefits, including a waiver of local
property taxes and taxes on profits for a limited time period. 177
By providing these benefits, the authors of the Draft Law believe they
can create favorable investment environments within the SEZs. 178 In turn,
they expect the SEZs to achieve the following goals:
174 Id. at *1 (translated by author).
1 Id. at *2.
176 Id.
177 Id. at *2-3.
171 Id. at *4.
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A shift in the economic structure of the region towards high-
technology processing industries;
* Creation of workplaces, especially in the regions with high risk
of unemployment;
Accelerated development of the economically depressed
territories through diversification of their production bases,
expansion of the tax base, and provision of their infrastructure
needs.17
9
Thus, the Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs demonstrates that
the drafters carefully considered the history of Russian SEZ failures and the
experiences of other nations in creating the Draft Law.
B. The Draft Law Provides for Tight Controls and Limited Benefits of
SEZs
Although the Draft Law does not completely follow the vision of the
Note on the Principles of Creation of SEZs,18° it represents a significant step
forward in Russian SEZ legislation. First, it envisions two types of SEZs:
industrial-production zones and technology-implementation zones.1 81 Each
type of zone is intended to target the specific strengths of its individual
locale.
The SEZ's underlying purpose is described as "stimulation of
production of high technology and highly processed goods, including
industrial goods, through the use of intellectual property and implementation
of competitive innovations at the domestic market of the Russian Federation
and in the world markets."'182 Thus, in defining the scope of activities and
the purposes of the zones, the draft authors deliberately focused on the
regions' growth potentials, rather than on their development needs. While
this is not entirely consistent with the expectation that the zones would
provide for increased employment and accelerated development of
economically depressed territories, 183 it is a welcome deviation from prior
approaches that regarded the creation of SEZs as an immediate panacea to
179 id.
ISO See infra Part V.
's1 Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, art. 3.
182 Id. art. 4.
1 See Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7, at *4.
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the problems of regional development. 184
The Draft Law also provides for a uniform procedure for creation of
SEZs. In accordance with article 5.2, the "[d]ecision on the creation of an
SEZ on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation is made by the
Government of the Russian Federation, based on the results of the review of
the applications of the subject of the Russian Federation for creation of
SEZ." 185 Applications are to be selected on a competitive basis and
evaluated on criteria furnished by the government. 186 The primary criteria to
be used in considering applications for industrial production SEZs include
the zone's need for public financing, infrastructure capability, proximity to
export markets, and availability of qualified labor. 187 The approved
subject 188 of the Russian Federation on the territory subject to SEZ
formation must conclude an agreement with the Government of the Russian
Federation specifying 1) the sources of financing of the infrastructure
projects, including federal, regional, and local budget shares; 2) a program
designed to ensure appropriate outfitting and technological equipment of the
SEZ; 3) participation in the administration of the SEZ; 4) responsibilities of
the federal, regional, and municipal organs in providing regulation of
business and investment activity; and 5) rights and responsibilities of the
parties in connection with the operation of the SEZ. 8 9
Further, the Draft Law provides for a strictly controlled regime of
SEZ operation. In accordance with article 9, the SEZ is managed by a
"special organ of the state, created in accordance with the present federal
law, that performs the functions of administering the SEZ," referred to as the
"Administration of SEZ."' 90 The use of the phrase "organ of the state"
implies the federal status of this body. 191 This tight level of control places
the Administration of SEZ and its head firmly under the control of the
federal government.
1" See, e.g., the purpose clauses of FEZ Nakhodka Regulations, supra note 109; FEZ Sakhalin
Regulations, supra note 44.
1 Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, art. 5.2.
186, See id. art. 5.4.
187 See id. art. 6.2.
18' The Russian Federation consists of eighty-nine territorial units with differing levels of autonomy.
Russian law refers to all units within this system of"asynmetric federalism" as subjects of the Federation.
189 See Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, art. 5.5.
190 Id. art. 9.2.
191 Other provisions of the Draft Law further confirm that the Administration of SEZ is accountable
to the federal government. The head of the Administration of SEZ is appointed by the Government of the
Russian Federation upon agreement with the subject of the Russian Federation hosting the SEZ, see id. art.
9.3, and bears responsibility under the laws of the Russian Federation for failure to fulfill his or her
functions. See id. art. 9.7. The Administration of SEZ reports to the Government of the Russian Federation,
by submitting an annual report on the SEZ's progress. See id. arts. 9.5, 10.1.
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The Draft Law provides for SEZs that would be quite limited in
geographic and temporal scope and confer benefits only upon a limited set
of enterprises. For example, industrial production zones may occupy no
more than ten square kilometers' 92 and exist for no more than twenty years
from the date of creation.193 Technology implementation zones may occupy
no more than one square kilometer' 94 and exist for just fifteen years., 95 No
extension of the term is allowed. 196 A business registered in accordance
with Russian law as a legal entity that seeks SEZ resident status must timely
submit documents to the Administration of SEZ detailing its investment
proposals and the manner of their implementation. 197 In order to be
considered for SEZ resident status, a business must be an entirely new legal
entity, not simply the product of a reorganization, and must invest a sum in
rubles in excess of E 10 million, excluding its non-material assets.198 If the
Administration of SEZ decides to approve the investment proposal, it must
conclude an investment agreement with the legal entity that submitted the
proposal, recognizing the business as an SEZ resident. 99 Thus, the Draft
Law provides SEZ preferences only to a limited set of businesses with
serious ideas for new projects and significant investment capabilities.
In exchange for allowing such limited access to benefits, the Draft
Law provides significant protections for SEZ residents ranging from
untimely termination of the SEZ status200 or its accompanying benefits20' to
other unpredictable events. 202 For example, article 22.1 provides that
"[flederal laws and other regulations of the Russian Federation adversely
affecting the legal and (or) economic situation of the residents of
SEZ... shall not be applied during the duration of SEZ status." 203
Inspections other than those performed by tax and customs authorities may
be conducted only in the form of "comprehensive" inspections, and their
192 Id. art. 6.1.
193 Id. art. 8.1.
"9 Id. art. 7.1.
'9' Id. art. 8.1.
'96 Id. art. 8.2.
197 See id. art. 13.2. Industrial-production zone participants must do this within ten days of their
registration as a legal entity. Id.
'9 See id. art. 13.4.
'99 See id. art. 13.5.
200 Termination of the SEZ status before the expiration of its term, except as provided by law for
national defense purposes, is prohibited. Id. art. 8.3.
201 See id. art. 22.
202 See id. arts. 20-21.
203 Id. art. 22.1. Part 2 of this article, however, provides exceptions for federal laws and other
normative acts in defense of the constitutional system, morality, health, and legal rights of other persons, as
well as national defense. Id. art. 22.2.
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results may be appealed to administrative or judicial authorities. 20 4  In
addition to the standard guarantee of just and adequate compensation in the
event of a nationalization of property,205 the Draft Law also provides
investors with a right to be compensated for illegal actions (or failures to act)
of the state, local, or SEZ authorities. 206 On the other hand, the taxation and
customs privileges that the Draft Law provides are relatively limited.207
Nevertheless, the Russian Finance Ministry has opposed the adoption of the
Draft Law on the ground that its tax and customs privileges may conflict
208with Russia's future WTO obligations.
C. Russia's Impending WTO Accession Does Not Prohibit Adoption of
the Draft Law
Russia is currently negotiating for early WTO accession209-a top
government priority.21° Critics who have objected to the Draft Law on the
ground that it is incompatible with Russia's future WTO obligations have
argued that the establishment of SEZs could violate the principle of fair
211market competition. 2 In light of the Russian government's high
prioritization of early WTO accession, this issue requires attention.12 As
previously noted, China's WTO accession process resulted in commitments
to revoke certain SEZ tax and customs preferences that are the hallmark of
SEZs' "special" status.213 Further, the subject of SEZs has already been
raised in Russia's WTO accession talks. 1
4
A review of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties ("Subsidies Agreement") reveals that
2o4 See id. art. 15.
205 See id. art. 21.
206 See id. art. 20.3.
207 See id. arts. 18-19; Appendix B, Tax Code Amendments, supra note 168.
208 See Cabinet to Discuss Mid-term Results of WTO Membership Talks, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY,
July 9, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File. The principal critic of the Draft Law on SEZ has been
the Russian Finance Ministry. See Finance Ministry Opposes Inclusion of Special Tax and Customs
Regime Into Law on Special Economic Zones, supra note 171, at * 1.
2W For the status of Russian WTO accession talks, see Accessions: Russian Federation, at
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/acc e/al russie-e.htin (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
210 See Maxim Medvedkov, Russia's Accession to the WTO: The View From Russia, in RussiA AND
THE WTO 37 (Katinka Barysch ed., 2002). Currently, the Russian government plans to conclude accession
talks in 2004. See Russia About to Wrap Up Coordination of WTO Accession, INTERFAX NEWS
AGENCY,Jne 18, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File.
21! See Cabinet to Discuss Mid-term Results of WTO Membership Talks, supra note 208.
212 Indeed, MEDT has recognized the issue as "weighty." See Russian Govt Plans to Discuss Results
So Far of WTO Accession, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, July 3, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File.
23 See supra Part II.A.3.
214 Russia and WTO Complete Round of Talks, ROSBUSINESSCONSULTING DATABASE, Oct. 31, 2003,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, RBC File.
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the Draft Law does not contravene them per se.215 Article 1 of the Subsidies
Agreement provides that:
a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any
public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this
Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g.
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of
funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not
collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)(1) 216
Under this definition, the Draft Law's treatment of SEZs may
certainly be deemed a subsidy. The tax benefits and waivers of custom
duties granted to SEZ residents can likely qualify as "revenue forgone"
under article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii).
The Subsidies Agreement considers subsidies problematic only if they
are either prohibited under Part II, or actionable under Part III. Prohibited
subsidies include:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as
one of several other conditions, upon export performance,
including those illustrated in Annex I;
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several
other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported
goods.217
The Draft Law does not make any export-contingent subsidies or
subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic, rather than imported,
goods. 218 Nothing in the Draft Law makes the conferral of any of its
215 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Charter, Annex IA,
LEGAL TEXTS [hereinafter Subsidies Agreement].
216 Id. art. 1.1.
217 Id. art. 3.1 (footnotes omitted).
218 See generally Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6.
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benefits directly or indirectly dependent on reaching certain export targets or
the use of any domestic goods.219 In fact, the Draft Law principally
concerns itself not with promoting exports, but rather with restructuring
regional Russian exports so as to increase the share of highly processed
goods as opposed to raw materials. 220 The ability to receive tax and custom
preferences in a Russian SEZ, as contemplated by the Draft Law, depends
only on the enterprise's status as an SEZ resident.221 This, in turn, depends
on the presentation of an acceptable investment project and the ability to
invest a sum in rubles exceeding E 10 million in this project. 222
Consequently, the Draft Law does not provide any prohibited subsidies.
In order to be actionable under Part III of the Subsidies Agreement, a
subsidy must be specific within the meaning of article 2.223 Article 2
provides that a subsidy may be deemed specific where the "granting
authority... explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises. 224
In addition, "[a] subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located
within a designated geographical region... shall be specific., 225 Under
both of these standards the benefits provided by the Draft Law can qualify as
specific subsidies. They are both limited to certain enterprises-those that
satisfy the criteria for SEZ resident status-and provided within a designated
226geographical region, the territory of the SEZ. Hence, the Draft Law
provides specific subsidies to SEZ residents and they may fall under the
category of actionable subsidies.
Even though the subsidies envisioned by the Draft Law are specific,
they are not actionable. Article 5 of the Subsidies Agreement prohibits only
specific subsidies that may cause adverse effects to the interests of other
WTO members in the form of "an injury to the domestic industry,
nullification or impairment of certain benefits accruing to other members, or
serious prejudice to the interests of another member., 227 Although the terms
"injury to the domestic industry" and "serious prejudice" are subject to
further definitions and may generate disagreement among nations, they are
not likely to be caused by the types of subsidies that the Draft Law provides.
The Draft Law generally confers its tax and customs preferences upon
219 See id.
220 See id. art. 4.
22' See id. arts. 18, 19.
2 Id. art. 13.
223 See Subsidies Agreement, supra note 215, art. 1.2.
224Id. art. 2.1(a).
225id.
26 See Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, arts. 6, 7, 13, 18 & 19.
227 See Subsidies Agreement, supra note 215, art. 5.
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investors willing to make a significant investment into a new business
project.228 These preferences are designed to promote the creation of the
high technology and advanced processing industries, and provide them with
limited relief during their nascent years. Such industries are not likely to
pose such an immediate threat of competition to the industries of other WTO
members that it would cause an injury or serious prejudice to them.
In addition, potential Russian SEZs in the RFE should be
distinguished from Chinese SEZs. The major Chinese SEZs, such as the
Shenzhen SEZ, existed for twenty years or more at the time of China's entry
to WTO.23 ° Chinese SEZs have become major exporters of goods, reaching
US$ 25 billion in exports from Shenzen SEZ alone.231 As such, they may
well present threats of injury or serious prejudice to the domestic industries
of other WTO members. Thus, it is not surprising that WTO members that
negotiated China's admission to WTO compelled it to commit to revoking
preferential tax and custom treatment in its highly competitive SEZs.
2 A
Potential Russian SEZs, on the other hand, are not likely to present equally
competitive threats to WTO members in the foreseeable future. For this
reason, Russia should not be deterred from adopting the Draft Law by fear
of potential non-compliance with WTO standards.
V. THE DRAFr LAW SHOULD BE REVISED TO MORE EFFECTIVELY HELP
THE RussIAN FAR EAST
The Draft Law has many advantages over previous SEZ legislation,
but it is far from perfect. Deficiencies include a lack of total certainty
regarding future rulemaking for SEZs, unreasonable limits on access to SEZ
resident status, excessive restrictions on local rulemaking, and low inability
to promote much-needed development of RFE regions. Russian policy
makers should remedy these defects before adopting the Draft Law.
First, the Draft Law does not fully implement the intent of the drafters
to provide what they identified as the top benefit of an SEZ-an
2n See Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7, at *4. Legal entities that existed before
their application for SEZ resident status simply cannot obtain this status. See Appendix A, Draft Law,
supra note 6, art. 13.4.
229 The exemptions from the profit taxes are limited to the maximum of seven years, and remaining
exemptions from property taxes and duties on imported goods are limited by the term of duration of SEZ
status-fifteen or twenty years. See Appendix B, Tax Code Amendments, supra note 168; Appendix A,
Draft Law, supra note 6, arts. 8, 18.
230 See supra Part III.A.1, 2.
23 See SEZs After China's Entering WTO, supra note 63, at *2.
2 See Protocol, supra note 91.
VOL. 13 No. 2
RUSSIAN DRAFTLA w ON SEZs
administrative framework of maximum simplicity and predictability.233 For
example, one of the administrative stimuli that the Note on the Principles of
Creation of SEZs expressly mentions is simplified procedures for exit and
entry of foreign citizens.23 The Draft Law has no provision to simplify the
immigration regime, except that one of the functions of the Administration
of SEZ is to "issue invitations for visas of foreign citizens for work in the
territory of SEZ.' 235 In fact, the creation of a special simplified immigration
procedure is possible, but not specifically provided for in the Draft Law.
Further elaboration of legal norms and standards governing the operation of
SEZs may be achieved through "other laws," as well as federal and local
regulations.236 The Draft Law does not precisely allocate responsibility for
provision of regulations, choosing instead to have the matter decided by
agreement between the central Government, the subject of Russian
Federation, and municipal authorities.237 This not only creates a potentially
divisive issue for the SEZ agreement, but also fails to provide potential
investors with sufficient guidance on what regulation to expect from various
regulatory bodies.
Second, the Draft Law does not provide municipal authorities with
sufficient policy and rulemaking autonomy. Success of the SEZs in China
depended in part on the delegation to local SEZ administrations and
municipal authorities of the right to develop their own sophisticated local
regulatory regimes and to administer the tax proceeds of SEZs according to
their local needs. 238 Although the Draft Law envisions some local
participation in the rulemaking process, 2 39 it is not clear precisely what role
local authorities may play. Almost all of the profit tax revenue resulting
from operation of the SEZ under the Draft Law must be remitted to the
central government. 240 The main administrative organ of SEZs-the
Administration of SEZs-answers directly to the Federal Government of the
Russian Federation.241 This arrangement may help to limit corruption and
233 See supra Part IV.A.
24 See Note on Principles of Creation of SEZs, supra note 7, at *3.
2 Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, art. 10.1.
236 The Draft Law provides that the regulation of operation of SEZs can be provided in accordance
with the Constitution of Russian Federation by the Draft Law itself, normative acts of the subjects of the
Russian Federation, and other laws. See id. art. 1. Further, the Government of Russian Federation may
adopt normative acts regarding operation of SEZs. Id.
237 The SEZ agreement between the subject of the Russian Federation, the municipal authorities, and
the Government would specify responsibilities of the federal, regional, and municipal organs in providing
regulation of business and investnent activity. Id. art. 5.5.
238 See supra Part LII.B.2.
239 See Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, art. 5.5.
240 See Appendix B, Tax Code Amendments, supra note 168.
241 See supra Part IV.B.
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political infighting and prevent problems such as those that deterred the
development of the Nakhodka SEZ. On the other hand, because the
leadership appointed by the central government is answerable only to the
central government, appointees may not fully understand or consider local
concerns. The centrally-controlled administration may also be tempted to
achieve the highest return possible in terms of increased exports, at the
expense of local physical and business infrastructure improvements. A
better version of the law on SEZs would provide for a greater and more
certain degree of autonomy for local authorities in arranging their economic
affairs, while allowing for some central oversight, perhaps through periodic
reporting and fiscal incentives.
Third, while specification of criteria for establishment of an SEZ and
conferral of SEZ resident status is a step in the right direction, few places in
Russia may be able to meet such stringent requirements. Much depends on
how strictly the Russian government will apply these criteria. For example,
if availability of infrastructure is one of the main criteria for SEZ site
selection, and a particular location currently has poor infrastructure but good
potential for growth given an appropriate investment in infrastructure, it is
questionable whether it could obtain the SEZ status.242 The Draft Law may
thus set a prohibitively high bar to achieve the ends that it seeks to achieve.
Finally, while the Draft Law is generally well-intentioned, it may
prove too little too late for some potentially viable zones in the RFE. This is
due to its provision that invalidates the status of all existing SEZs, with
special exceptions provided by federal laws.243 Further, the date when the
first SEZs are expected to begin operation is 2006, assuming that the Draft
Law will be adopted in 2004.2* Yet there are at least two SEZs that already
formally exist in the RFE.245 The business expectations of investors in these
242 Such analysis is especially pertinent for the future of the Kuril Islands. They present a case where
the provision of guarantees and incentives to establish advanced sea product processing and ship repair
facilities may spur development due to the wealth of the marine resources, as well as great physical and
perhaps even cultural proximity to the Japanese market. See Stanley R. Boots, Comment, The Personal
Contacts Alternative - A Comparison of Japanese and Russian Legal Cultures in the Russian Far East
Timber Trade, 9 INT4L LEGAL PERSP. 257 (1997) (arguing that there are substantial similarities between
Russian and Japanese ways of conducting business and negotiation styles). Unfortunately, the
infrastructure of the islands is in a dreadful condition, but it is conceivable that through the assistance of the
Federal Program of Development and the revenues of Sakhalin oil projects it could be greatly improved.
Yet with strict application of the Draft Law conditions such as the availability of infrastructure and the
minimum investment off 10 million to establish new high-technology enterprises, the Kurils may never be
able to get the SEZ status or attract sufficient investment.243 See Appendix A, Draft Law, supra note 6, art. 23.244 See Economics Ministry to Submit Bill on Special Economic Zones, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, Jan.
28, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTFAX File.245 See supra Part I.B. 1 for FEZ Nakhodka; see also supra, note 100 for FEZ Magadan.
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existing SEZs may be greatly disappointed by the lack of continuity in the
Draft Law. Russian policynakers would therefore do well to specifically
provide for continuance of the status of the existing SEZs in the Draft Law
and for a gradual period of transition to the new SEZ regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
After many years of mismanagement and neglect, the RFE today is in
great need of development. The experience of many countries has shown
that SEZs can help to promote local economic development when the right
conditions are provided. In China, in particular, openness and autonomy
allowed in the SEZs has helped to turn small rural communities into
recipients of billions of dollars of FDI and exporters of billions of dollars
worth of products. Yet Russian experimentation with SEZs in the Far East
up to now has failed to produce favorable results due to inadequate legal and
physical infrastructures as well as lack of political, economic, and legal
stability. The new Draft Law is a promising approach that builds upon the
lessons of the past to provide a more certain and reliable investment
environment. However, to help ensure the Draft Law's success in promoting
development of the Russian Far East, Russian policymakers should include
several changes, including provisions specifying division of central and local
authority, allowing for greater local involvement in SEZ administration,
softening criteria for conferral of SEZ benefits, and providing for
continuation of the existing zones. The sooner such SEZ legislation is
adopted, the sooner the RFE may realize its great potential for development.
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APPENDIX A - Draft Law-
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL LAW
ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
This Federal law regulates the creation, functioning and termination of
the status of special economic zones on the territory of the Russian
Federation, as well as entrepreneurial and investment activities in the special
economic zones.
Article 1. Russian Federation legislation on special economic zones
Legal regulation of relations associated with the creation, functioning,
and termination of the status of special economic zones on the territory of
the Russian Federation takes place in accordance with the Constitution of the
Russian Federation, the present Federal law, regulatory acts of the subjects
of the Russian Federation adopted in accordance with it, as well as other
legislative acts of the Russian Federation.
In the circumstances prescribed in the present Federal law, the
Government of the Russian Federation adopts regulatory acts on the
functioning of special economic zones and activity on the territories of
special economic zones.
Article 2. Definition of special economic zone
A special economic zone (SEZ) is that part of the territory of the
Russian Federation, where, in accordance with the present Federal law and
other legislative acts of the Russian Federation, a special regime of
entrepreneurial and investment activity is established, and a regime of free
custom zone is created.
Article 3. Types of special economic zones
Translations in Appendices A and B contain minor formatting changes introduced by the author to
enhance readability. Otherwise, translated versions of the Draft Law and Tax Code Amendments are true
to the original Russian versions.
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SEZs created on the territory of the Russian Federation may be:
* industrial-production zones,
* technology-implementation zones.
Article 4. Goals of creating special economic zones
SEZs are created with the goals of activization of production of goods
of high level of processing and technology, including industrial goods,
through the use of intellectual property and implementation of innovations
competitive at the domestic market of the Russian Federation and world
markets.
CHAPTER 2. CREATION AND TERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
Article 5. General procedure for creation of special economic zones
1. Creation of an SEZ takes place by decision of the Government
of the Russian Federation in accordance with the requirements of the present
article.
2. Decision on the creation of an SEZ on the territory of a subject
of the Russian Federation is made by the Government of the Russian
Federation based on the results of the review of the applications of the
subject of the Russian Federation for creation of SEZ.
3. An application for creation of an SEZ is submitted by the
subject of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the organs of local
self-governance of the municipal entities on the territory of which it is
proposed to create an SEZ.
An application of the subject of the Russian Federation for creation of
an SEZ is supplemented by documents confirming the consent of the organs
of local self-governance of the municipal entities on the territory of which an
SEZ is planned to delegate the control over the territory of SEZ to
Administration of SEZ.
The form of application, guidelines for its completion, as well as the
procedure and timelines for submitting applications, and the list of the
required documents submitted with the application for creation of an SEZ is
determined by the Government of the Russian Federation in accordance with
the requirements of the present Federal law.
4. Selection among applications for creation of SEZs of the same
types is done by the Government of the Russian Federation on competitive
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basis. The procedure and criteria for the competitive selection are
determined by the Government of the Russian Federation.
5. Based on the review of the applications for creation of SEZ and
the decision to create an SEZ by the Government of the Russian Federation
the executive organs of the subject of the Russian Federation and the organs
of local self-governance of the municipal entities, on the territory of which it
is proposed to create an SEZ, conclude an agreement.
The agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation,
executive organs of the subject of the Russian Federation and the organs of
local self-governance of the municipal entities on the territory of which the
SEZ is to be created, establishes:
* sources of funding of the creation of infrastructure of the SEZ,
including the respective shares from the federal, regional, and
local budgets;
* a complex of measures designed to ensure the equipment and
material-technological provisioning of the SEZ;
* participation in the activity of the organ of governance of the
SEZ;
* duties of the federal, regional and municipal organs in creation
of the regime of monitoring of entrepreneurial and investment
activity on the territory of the SEZ;
* rights and obligations of the parties in connection with the
functioning of the SEZ.
Article 6. Creation of industrial-production zones
1. Industrial production zones are created on territory not
exceeding 10 square kilometers.
2. The major criteria in review of the desirability of creation of
industrial production zones are:
* the need for financial resources from the budgets of all levels of
the budgeting system of the Russian Federation for creation of
the industrial-production zone;
* potential availability of objects of infrastructure of all kinds;
* proximity to potential markets for realization of goods;
* potential availability of well-qualified labor resources.
3. At the time of the decision of the Government of the Russian
Federation on creation of industrial-production zones in the subject of the
Russian Federation, the territory provided for the SEZ may not contain
(except for the property owned by the state and (or) the municipality)
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property owned in any way by legal or natural persons, as well as property
that belongs to the residential fund in accordance with laws of the Russian
Federation.
Article 7. Creation of technological-implementation zones
1. Technological-implementation zones are created on limited
parcels of land that overall do not exceed 1 square kilometer.
2. Technological-implementation zones are created on separate
parcels of land, or on the territories of the industrial-production zones, or on
the territories connected to the institutions of higher education, preparing
specialists in the technical, exact, or natural sciences, and (or) scientific-
research institutions of the similar orientation.
3. Residents of technological-implementation zones are not
eligible for any grants, subsidies, or subventions from the federal budget.
Article 8. Termination of the status of special economic zone.
1. The status of an SEZ is terminated upon the expiration of the
term provided for by the present article.
The status of an industrial-production zone is valid for 20 years from
the time of its creation.
The status of a technological-implementation zone is valid for 15
years from the time of its creation.
2. Extension of the term of the status of an SEZ is not allowed.
3. Termination of the status of SEZ before the expiration of its
term determined in accordance with the present article is not allowed, except
in the circumstances provided for by the laws of the Russian Federation and
international agreements of the Russian Federation related to national
defense and security of the Russian Federation.
4. The procedure for termination of the status of SEZ, resolution
of property and other issues related to the termination of the status of SEZ,
as well as regulation of financial relations between the Administration of
SEZ and residents of SEZ are determined by the Government of the Russian
Federation in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation, including
the present Federal law.
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CHAPTER 3. ADMINISTRATION OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
Article 9. Organ of administration of special economic zone
1. Administration of the SEZ is effected by the Administration of
Special Economic Zone ("Administration of SEZ").
2. Administration of SEZ - a special organ of the state, created in
accordance with the present Federal law, that performs the functions of
administering the SEZ.
3. Administration of SEZ is headed by the head of the SEZ, who
is appointed by the Government of the Russian Federation upon
consultations with the administration of the subject of the Russian
Federation on the territory of which the SEZ is located.
4. The SEZ Bylaws are adopted by the Government of the Russian
Federation in cooperation with the subject of the Russian Federation
simultaneously with the decision to create the SEZ and conclusion of the
agreement on creation of the SEZ between the Government of the Russian
Federation, executive organs of the subject of the Russian Federation, and
organs of local self-governance of the municipal entity.
5. The Administration of SEZ reports to the Government of the
Russian Federation.
6. The procedure for financing of the activity of Administration of
SEZ is determined by the SEZ Bylaws.
7. The head of SEZ is responsible in accordance with the laws of
the Russian Federation for failure of the Administration of SEZ to perform
the functions provided for by the present Federal law.
Article 10. Functions of the Administration of special economic zone
1. Administration of SEZ performs the following functions in its
exercise of its authority in accordance with the laws of the Russian
Federation:
* exercises authority over the land on which the SEZ is located;
* acts as the procurement agent in the planning and construction
of the objects of infrastructure of the SEZ (planning and
construction of the customs infrastructure is performed by the
Administration of SEZ in cooperation with federal customs
authority);
reviews investment projects proposed for realization on the
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territory of the SEZ and issues written conclusions to support or
decline support for a particular investment project;
* performs registration of legal entities as residents of the SEZ;
* in the circumstances provided for by the present law, annuls the
registration of legal entities as residents of the SEZ;
* reports data on registration and annulment of registration of
legal entities as residents of the SEZ to tax authorities;
* maintains a register of the residents of the SEZ, provides
excerpts from the register upon request of a resident, and issues
certificate of residency in the SEZ;
* sets up the procedures for the required expert review and
approval of project and investment documentation;
* concludes agreements with residents of the SEZ within the
confines of its authority;
* develops proposals on realization (changes) of the strategy and
program of development of the SEZ and submits them to the
Government of the Russian Federation, executive organs of the
subject of the Russian Federation, and organs of local self-
governance;
* represents the SEZ in interactions with the organs of state
authority and local self-governance, Russian and foreign
investors and international organizations;
+ issues invitations to foreign citizens for obtaining visas for
work on the territory of the SEZ; and
* monitors compliance of the residents of the SEZ with the terms
of investment agreements.
Each year not later than April 1 of the year following the reporting
year, the Administration of SEZ reports to the Government of the Russian
Federation on the results of the operation of the SEZ during the reporting
year.
2. Administration of SEZ may not:
* act as a founder (participant) of the entities-residents of the
SEZ;
* be a part of the governing organs of the entities-residents of
the SEZ;
* interfere in entrepreneurial activity performed by the residents
of the SEZ.
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Article 11. Procedure for dispute resolution
Disputes arising out of creation of the SEZ, violation of the conditions
of entrepreneurial or investment activity on the territory of the SEZ,
termination of the status of the SEZ, as well as arising out of agreements
concluded with the participation of Administration of SEZ and residents of
the SEZ, are resolved through judicial procedure in accordance with subject
matter jurisdiction established by the laws of the Russian Federation.
CHAPTER 4. FEATURES OF THE REGIME OF ENTERPRENERIAL
ACTIVITY IN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
Article 12. Regime of entrepreneurial and (or) investment activity in special
economic zone
Except for the circumstances in section 1, Article 14 of the present
Federal law, residents of SEZ may perform entrepreneurial and (or)
investment activity on the territory of the SEZ in accordance with the
requirements of the present Federal law.
Article 13. Registration in the special economic zone
1. State registration of legal entities on the territory of a special
economic zone takes place in accordance with the laws on state registration
of legal entities.
2. A legal entity registered on the territory of a technological-
implementation zone and aspiring to acquire the status of resident of this
zone, shall supply the Administration of SEZ with a certificate of state
registration, a copy of its bylaws, as well as documents containing the
necessary information about the goals and purposes of investment projects
planned for realization on the territory of the special economic zone, as well
as information on the procedure for their implementation, and other
necessary data.
A legal entity registered on the territory of an industrial-production
zone and aspiring to acquire the status of resident of this zone, shall supply
the Administration of SEZ with the named documents within ten days from
the time of state registration.
Upon review of the documentation submitted by the legal entity
established on the territory of the SEZ, the Administration of SEZ shall
make one of the following decisions:
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* to approve the investment project and conclude an investment
agreement; or
* to decline approval of the investment project.
The list of documents that must be submitted to the Administration of
SEZ for its review, as well as the procedure for their submission and the
timeline for the review of investment projects, shall be determined by the
Government of the Russian Federation.
3. Within one month of the decision to approve the investment
project the Administration of SEZ shall sign an investment agreement with
the legal entity registered on the territory of the SEZ.
4. The amount of assets proposed by the investment project to be
invested on the territory of industrial-production zone (exclusive of non-
material assets) must exceed the sum in rubles equivalent to 10 (ten) million
euro, as calculated based on the exchange rate of the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation on the day of concluding the investment agreement with
the Administration of SEZ.
A legal entity aspiring to acquire the status of resident of industrial-
production zone may not be established through re-organization of an
existing legal entity or several existing legal entities.
5. The Head of Administration of SEZ makes a decision to
recognize a legal entity registered on the territory of SEZ as a resident of
special economic zone based on the presence of an investment agreement
between the Administration of SEZ and the legal entity.
The decision to recognize a legal entity as a resident of special
economic zone shall be made by the Head of Administration of SEZ within
ten days from the time of the signing and entry into force of the investment
agreement.
The Administration of SEZ shall record the recognition of a legal
entity as a resident of the SEZ in the special register within three days from
the decision to recognize the legal entity as a resident of special economic
zone by the Head of Administration of SES [sic]. Legal entity recognized as
a resident of SEZ shall receive a certificate of residency from the
Administration of SEZ. The form of the certificate shall be determined by
the Administration of SEZ.
A legal entity recognized as a resident of SEZ acquires the status of
resident of special economic zone at the time of issuance of certificate of
residency in the SEZ.
6. Administration of SEZ shall report the information on
recognition or annulment of recognition as a resident of SEZ to the tax
authority within three days.
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7. The resident of the SEZ acquires the rights and duties necessary
only for the entrepreneurial and (or) investment activities on the territory of
SEZ in accordance with the goals and purposes of the SEZ and requirements
of the present Federal law.
8. The resident of the SEZ may not:
* act as a founder (participant) of entities, including residents of
the SEZ;
* be a part of the governing organs of entities, including residents
of the SEZ;
* have separate subdivisions outside the territory of the SEZ.
Article 14. Limitations on certain types of entrepreneurial activity
1. The territory of the SEZ may not contain objects or enterprises
of the national defense character, extractive, energy, iron ore and mineral
mining industries, or serve for production of dual use goods subject to excise
tax (except for passenger cars and motorcycles), arms or military equipment.
2. Residents of industrial production zones may not engage in
activity other than that included in the investment project.
3. The activity of residents of technological-implementation zones
must be consistent with the specialization of the higher education institutions
and (or) scientific-research institutes referred to in section 2 of Article 7 of
the present Federal law.
Article 15. Activity of state inspection organs on the territory of special
economic zone
1. State inspection organs may conduct inspections of the
residents of the SEZ in accordance with the Federal law "On protection of
the rights of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs during state
inspections," and in accordance with the provisions of this article.
2. Inspections, other than customs and tax inspections conducted
by the officials of customs and tax authorities of the Russian Federation,
may be conducted only as comprehensive inspections.
Comprehensive inspections provided for by this article are conducted
upon decision of Administration of SEZ with participation of inspection
organs authorized to inspect the activity of residents on the territory of the
SEZ.
Comprehensive inspections shall be conducted at least once every
three years, and may last no longer than two weeks, except for the
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circumstances provided for in section 3 of this article and in the Customs
Code of the Russian Federation.
3. In the event of a finding in the course of a comprehensive
inspection conducted by state inspection officials of violations of the laws of
the Russian Federation and requirements established on the territory of the
SEZ for residents of the SEZ, the violator shall be subjected to an additional
inspection, the subject matter of which will be ensuring compliance with
instructions to correct the violations.
4. Upon the finding, based on the additional inspection, that a
resident of the SEZ failed to comply with instructions to correct the
violations within two months, the Administration of SEZ shall annul the
recognition of the status of resident of the SEZ.
5. During a comprehensive inspection, the resident of the SEZ has
a right to:
* be present during the inspection and provide explanations
regarding the subject matter of inspection;
* receive information, disclosure of which is provided for by the
regulatory acts of the Russian Federation;
* review the results of the inspection and note in the inspection
report the fact of its review, agreement or disagreement with the
report, as well as agreement or disagreement with the particular
actions of state inspection officials;
* appeal the actions (or inactions) of the state inspections officials
through administrative and (or) judicial channels in accordance
with the laws of the Russian Federation.
6. The rights and responsibilities of tax and customs organs of the
Russian Federation conducting tax and (or) customs inspections on the
territory of the SEZ are prescribed by the laws of the Russian Federation.
The rights and liabilities of the residents of the SEZ during tax and (or)
customs inspections are prescribed by the tax and customs laws of the
Russian Federation.
Article 16. The procedure for expert review of project documentation
1. Documents required for expert review of investment project
documentation shall be submitted to the Administration of SEZ.
2. Administration of SEZ shall set up the procedure for expert
review of project documentation in accordance with the laws of the Russian
Federation and special requirements of this article.
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3. The scope of the expert review shall be limited to evaluation of
project decisions touching upon the safety of life and health of people, safety
of erected buildings, other structures and constructions, and the consistency
of project decisions with the established construction standards.
4. The expert review of project documentation for investments
projects proposed for implementation on the territory of SEZ shall be
conducted in no more than 60 days for full expert review of project
documentation, and no more than 30 days for partial expert review of project
documentation.
5. Expert review of project documentation provided for in section
3 of this article shall be conducted by state expert organs and shall be
concluded by a resolution in the form of an expert opinion.
Article 17. The regime of land use in special economic zone
1. Administration of SEZ exercises authority over land allotted to
the SEZ in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation and the
provisions of the present Federal law.
2. Residents of an SEZ that erect real estate objects on leased land
in accordance with the terms of the investment projects within the SEZ, may,
upon registration of their rights by recording them in the Unified state
register and receiving a certificate of registration, buy out the leased land
plots at the market rate in the order established by the Land Code of the
Russian Federation.
3. The order and procedure for control of land use and real estate
objects by the Administration of SEZ is determined by the Government of
the Russian Federation in accordance with the laws of the Russian
Federation.
Article 18. Customs regulation in special economic zones
1. Residents of the SEZ may employ any of the customs regimes
provided for by the customs laws of the Russian Federation if otherwise not
provided for by this article.
2. Customs regime on the territory of the SEZ is free customs
zone established in accordance with the proclaimed goals and purposes of
the SEZ at the time of the decision of the Government of the Russian
Federation to create the SEZ.
3. For the purposes of the present article, a free customs zone is a
customs regime established within the territorial limits of the special
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economic zone, in which imported foreign goods may be brought in and
used within the appropriate territorial limits or structures (places) without
the payment of customs duties, taxes, and without any limitations or
restrictions of economic character established by the laws of the Russian
Federation on state control of international commerce while Russian goods
are brought in and used on conditions of the customs export regime, defined
by the customs laws of the Russian Federation.
4. Any goods, other than goods prohibited from import and export
from the customs territory of the Russian federation due to the
considerations of national defense, internal security, morality, life and health
of the people, protection of animal and plant species, protection of the
environment, and protection of intellectual property, may be placed under
the customs regime of free customs zone.
Customs authorities of the Russian Federation may not require
payment of customs duties or taxes at the time of placement of goods on the
territory of the special economic zone.
Goods required for ensuring the achievement of the purposes of a
special economic zone, such as technological equipment, goods intended for
constriction and equipment of buildings, structures, and constructions
included in the list established by the Government of the Russian Federation
at the time of decision to create the SEZ, may be brought in the special
economic zone under the free customs zone regime.
Goods with the potential to harm other goods or requiring special
storage conditions, must be stored in specially modified premises.
Goods previously placed under different customs regimes may be
placed under the free customs zone regime.
5. Goods placed under the free customs zone regime may be
subjected to the following operations:
1) safety and security procedures;
2) preparation of goods for sale or transportation, such as
separation into groups, shipping preparation, sorting,
packaging, repackaging, marking, as well as basic assembly
that does not alter the characteristics (quality) of goods;
3) processing;
4) tuning and testing of technological equipment and
products; and
5) elimination of industrial waste, if it is economically
unfeasible to place it under another customs regime.
Goods placed under the customs regime of free customs zone may be
sold, or title to them may be transferred otherwise, except for retail sales.
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The Government of the Russian Federation may determine the
procedure for limits and restrictions on specific operations with goods
placed under the customs regime of free customs zone.
In the event of violation of the present Federal law, customs
authorities of the Russian Federation may prohibit residents of the special
economic zone from engaging in operations with goods.
6. Upon request of an interested party, customs authority of the
Russian Federation shall confirm the origin of goods with a certificate of
origin on the territory of the appropriate special economic zones according
to the procedure determined by the Government of the Russian Federation.
In the absence of the certificate of origin, the goods shall be regarded
as Russian-made for the purposes of collection of customs duties and
application of economic policy at export, and otherwise as foreign-made.
Limits and restrictions of economic character imposed in accordance
with the laws of the Russian Federation on state regulation of international
commerce shall be applied based on the origin of goods as well as the
applicable customs regime.
The criteria for establishing the special economic zone as the place of
origin shall be determined by the Government of the Russian Federation at
the time of decision to create the special economic zone.
7. Goods placed under the customs regime of free customs zone
may remain on the territory of the special economic zone without a time
limit throughout the duration of the special economic zone.
8. Residents of a special economic zone shall maintain records of
goods placed under the customs regime of free customs zone, including
records on export and import, storage, production, processing, acquisition
and sale of goods and shall report to the customs authority of the Russian
Federation on the status of goods according to the procedure determined by
the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation. Any changes to the
goods within the special economic zone must be reflected in the records.
9. Goods remaining on the territory of the special economic zone
at the time of termination of the status of special economic zone shall be
transferred to another special economic zone, or placed under a different
customs regime within three months. As used here, goods for customs
purposes are considered to be goods remaining in a temporary storage
warehouse.
Objects of infrastructure found on the territory of the special
economic zone at the time of termination of its status the construction of
which required materials for which the customs authority assessed but did
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not require the payment of customs duties, shall remain in possession of
their respective owners without payment of the duties.
10. Special requirements for construction, provision and material-
technological equipment of the special economic zone, including
requirements necessitated by the needs of appropriate customs control, shall
be determined by the Government of the Russian Federation at the time of
creation of the special economic zone.
11. Import of goods into the territory of the special economic zone
and their export from the territory of the special economic zone may take
place only upon authorization of the customs authority of the Russian
Federation on the condition of compliance with the requirements of the
appropriate customs regime and requirements provided for by this Federal
law and other legislative acts of the Russian Federation. Customs authority
of the Russian Federation may at any time conduct customs inspection of
goods placed in the special economic zone, in accordance with the
appropriate customs regime.
Conditions for customs inspection of goods brought in, stored, or
taken out of the SEZ shall be determined by the State Customs Committee of
the Russian Federation.
Access of persons onto the territory of the special economic zone shall
take place in accordance with the procedure established with the
participation of the customs authority of the Russian Federation.
The customs authority of the Russian Federation may deny access
onto the territory of the special economic zone to persons who violate the
provisions of the present Federal law.
Article 19. Taxation of residents of special economic zone
1. A special procedure for assessment and payment of income and
property taxes shall be applied to residents of the SEZ in accordance with
the laws of Russian Federation on taxes and collections. The procedure for
assessment of taxes and the time frames for their payment shall be
determined by the laws of the Russian Federation on taxes and collections.
The above-mentioned procedure for taxation is applied to residents of
SEZ in accordance with limitations established by the present Federal law
and the Tax Code of the Russian Federation.
2. Entities that operate on the territory of the SEZ but do not have
the status of resident of SEZ shall pay taxes and collections in accordance
with the general procedure established by the laws of the Russian Federation
on taxes and collections.
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Article 20. Guarantee of legal protection of investors in special economic
zone
1. Investors may conduct investment activities on the territory of
SEZ in any form not prohibited by the laws of the Russian Federation.
Investors are entitled to full and unconditional protection of their
rights and interests provided for by this Federal law, other federal laws or
regulatory acts of the Russian Federation, as well as international
agreements of the Russian Federation.
2. Goods, materials, parts or other products, including industrial
goods, brought onto the territory of the SEZ for entrepreneurial activity as
part of an investment project shall not be alienated.
3. The investor is entitled to compensation of losses suffered as a
result of illegal actions (failures to act) of the state organs, organs of local
self-governance, governing organs of the SEZ or officials of these organs, as
well as a result of inadequate performance of their duties in accordance with
the laws of the Russian Federation by these organs or officials.
Article 21. The guarantee of compensation in the event of nationalization
and requisition of the property of investor.
1. Property of an investor shall not be alienated, including by
nationalization or requisition, except in the circumstances and upon the basis
determined by federal law or international agreements of the Russian
Federation.
2. In the event of requisition the investor shall receive market
value of the requisitioned property. In the event that the circumstances
which triggered the requisition cease to exist, the investor may request the
return of remaining property through judicial channels, but shall remit the
compensation received for this property, minus the losses caused by
devaluation of property.
In the event of nationalization the investor receives the value of
nationalized property as well as other losses.
3. Disputes regarding compensation of losses shall be resolved in
accordance with the procedure established by the laws of the Russian
Federation.
Article 22. Guaranty of adverse change in laws of the Russian Federation
for investor in a special economic zone
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1. Federal laws and other regulations of the Russian Federation
adversely affecting the legal and (or) economic situation of the residents of
the SEZ in comparison to their situation before the adoption of such laws or
regulations, shall not be applied during the duration of the status of SEZ.
2. The provisions of section 1 of this article shall not apply to
changes and amendments introduced to the legislative acts of the Russian
Federation, or new federal laws or other regulatory acts of the Russian
Federation in the interests of protection of the constitutional system,
morality, heath, and the rights of other persons, as well as national defense
and security.
CHAPTER 5. FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 23. Status of existing special economic zones
From the time of entry into force of this law, the term of special
economic zones created prior to the adoption of the present Federal law shall
expire, except for the circumstances provided for by other Federal laws.
Article 24. Scope of application of the present Federal law
This federal law does not apply to creation and functioning of
recreation zones on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Article 25. Entry into force of the present Federal law
This federal law shall enter into force after one month after its official
publication.
The President of the Russian Federation.
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APPENDIX B - Tax Code Amendments
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL LAW
On amendments to part second of the Tax Code of the Russian
Federation and Law of Russia "On the property tax for legal entities"
Article 1. Chapter 25 "Tax on income of organizations" of the Tax Code of
the Russian Federation (Collection of laws of the Russian Federation. No. 33
(part I), p. 3429) shall be amended as follows:
"Article 288.1. Special taxation of residents of special economic zones.
1. This article establishes special taxation of organizations
possessing the status of resident of special economic zone (hereinafter-
"Resident of SEZ") and engaging in investment and entrepreneurial activity
in accordance with the requirements of the Federal law "On special
economic zones in the Russian Federation."
2. Residents of SEZ shall maintain separate records of revenues
and expenses attributable to the income discussed in section 3 of this article
and to the income subject to profit taxation according to the rates of article
284 of the Code.
3. The tax rates indicated in section 4 of this article shall apply to
the income defined as the monetary expression of revenue received from the
sale of goods produced on the territory of the SEZ, decreased by the
expenses associated with the production and (or) the sale of these goods.
Taxable income for taxation of profits obtained from the sale of goods
produced on the territory of the SEZ shall be determined separately for each
investment project in accordance with the procedure established by this
chapter of the Tax Code.
4. Income defined by section 3 of this article shall be taxed as
follows:
1) during the breakeven period of the investment project, but
not longer than three tax years from the beginning of
investment project - 0 percent;
2) during the fourth to seventh tax years from the beginning of
the investment project, with investment of 80 or more
percent of profits received by the resident of SEZ in
accordance with accounting rules into expansion of its own
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production facilities-3.75 percent. In this case the sum
assessed at the tax rate of 3.75 percent is directed toward
the federal budget;
3) during the fourth to seventh tax years from the beginning of
the investment project, with investment of up to 80 percent
of profits received by the resident of SEZ in accordance
with accounting rules into expansion of its own production
facilities- 12 percent.
In this case:
3.75 percent of the assessed tax is directed into federal
budget;
7.25 percent of the tax is directed into the budgets of
subjects of the Russian Federation;
1 percent of the tax is directed into the local budgets;
4) beginning with eighth tax year from the beginning of the
investment project the applicable tax rate is determined by
section 1 of article 284 of this Code.
For the purposes of this article, the beginning of investment project is
the time of receipt by the resident of the SEZ of a certificate of residency in
accordance with the Federal law "On special economic zones in the Russian
Federation."
Expansion of its own production facilities implies investment in
general facilities.
5. Profits obtained by residents of SEZ not included in the income
defined in section 3 are subject to taxation at the rate provided for by article
284 of the Code.
Article 2. Article 4 [providing for exceptions from property tax] of the Law
of the Russian Federation of December 13, 1991, No. 2030-1 "On the
property tax for legal entities" (Records of the Congress of people's deputies
of the Russian Federation and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation,
1992, No. 12, p. 599; No. 34, p. 1976; 1993, No. 4, p. 118; No. 14, p. 486;
No. 25, p. 905; Collection of laws of the Russian Federation, 1994, No. 29, p.
3010; 1995, No. 18, p. 1590; No. 26, p. 2402; No. 35, p. 3503; 1999, No. 7,
p. 879) shall be amended by subsection "y" providing as follows:
"y) organizations possessing the status of residents of special economic
zones in accordance with Federal law "On special economic zones in the
Russian Federation," with respect to the real property located on the territory
of SEZ, as well as certain other property."
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Article 3. This Federal law shall enter into force on January 1, 2004.
President of the Russian Federation.
